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In this study, I compare the default rates of firm loans issued by participation 
and conventional banks operating in Turkey by using survival analysis techniques for 
the period January 2011 - December 2012. Banks provided more than 4 million loans to 
firms during this period. I find that participation loans are more likely to default, 
controlling for borrower, loan and bank characteristics. However, loans of firms 
working with only participation banks are less prone to default compared to loans of 
firms working with both participation and conventional banks. The default rate of 
participation loans are found to be higher than that of conventional loans for the firm 
that borrows from both type of banks. Loans are less likely to default during Ramadan. 
It is found that large firm loans survive longer in cities where the population is high, 
where there are proportionately more mosques and more Al-Quran course participants 
per population. 
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Bu çalışmada,sağkalım analizi teknikleri kullanılarak Türkiye’deki katılım 
bankacılığı ve geleneksel bankacılık firma kredilerinin temerrüt olasılıkları 2011 Ocak-
2012 Aralık dönemi içerisinde karşılaştırılmıştır. Bankalar söz konusu dönemde, 
firmalara 4 milyonun üzerinde kredi tahsis etmişlerdir. Banka, borçlu ve kredi 
karakteristiklerinin etkisi kontrol edildiğinde, katılım kredilerinin temerrüt olasılığı, 
geleneksel kredilere göre daha fazladır. Sadece katılım bankalarından kredi kullanan 
kişilerin kredi temerrüt olasılığı, her iki banka tipinden kredi kullananların kredi 
temerrüt olasılığından düşüktür. Her iki banka tipinden de borç alanlar incelendiğinde, 
katılım kredilerinin temerrüt olasılıkları aynı şekilde görece yüksektir. Büyük krediler 
incelendiğinde, kredi temerrüt olasılığı nüfusun fazla olduğu, kişi başı cami oranının 
yüksek olduğu ve kişi başı Kuran kursu katılımcısının fazla olduğu illerde daha 
düşüktür. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
The assets of the global Islamic finance industry have a compound annual 
growth rate of 17% between 2009 and 2013. The value of its assets is estimated to be 
USD 1.87 trillion in the first half of 2014 (Islamic Financial Services Board, 2015). The 
expansion of Islamic Banks raised several questions in the minds of both academicians 
and practitioners. Questions, including but not limited to what products Islamic banks 
offer that are not offered by conventional banks, whether Islamic banks differ in terms 
of efficiency, risk and other theoretical or practical manners. In this thesis, one of these 
questions, whether Islamic and conventional banks are different in terms of credit risk, 
is tried to be answered using the firm loans issued by the commercial and participation 
banks operating in Turkey for the period 2011-2012.  
The contracts offered by Islamic and conventional banks seem to be similar 
other than Sharia compatibility and some operational nuances. Sharia rules forbid 
interest rate, gambling, too speculative actions and investment on banned products by 
Islam (Khan, 2010). One example of operational difference of Islamic banks from 
conventional banks is that they make a contract to buy a product on behalf of customer, 
rather than directly providing loan to borrower.  As Baele et al (2014) mention, Islamic 
and conventional banks offer similar credit contracts. Then, there is a question of who 
prefers to get loans from Islamic banks and whether there are differences in the default 
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probability of borrowers of two types of banks. Baele et al. (2014) report that religious 
beliefs of the borrowers are important in their bank choice in Pakistan. In terms of 
default probability, they find that Islamic loans are less prone to default, show lower 
probability of default during Ramadan, and in big cities where conservative parties are 
prominent in Pakistan. Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2011) investigate who is getting 
loans from these banks in Turkey and find that young firms, firms with multiple bank 
relationships, industry based firms and transparent firms are more likely to engage in 
Islamic banks in Turkey. Several questions can be raised based on their findings. For 
example, do young firms willingly engage in Islamic banks or do not they have any 
other option? That is, it might be the case that Islamic banks are dealing with firms not 
accepted by conventional banks due to risk concerns. The findings of this thesis will 
provide some answers to these questions.  
The participation banks in Turkey are designed as Islamic banks. They are 
separated from deposit banks by banking law Nr. 5411 (2005) such that they grant 
participation loans and collect participation funds.  Similar to Baele et al (2014), in this 
thesis, I test three hypotheses using the loans issued by banks operating in Turkey. The 
first hypothesis is that loans issued by participation banks are less likely to default than 
those issued by conventional banks, controlling for borrower, bank and loan 
characteristics. The second hypothesis is that if a borrower gets loans from both types 
of banks, he is more loyal to Islamic loan, i.e., he is more likely to pay back his loan 
from participation bank. Using mosques per population in a city, Al-Quran course 
participants per population in a city and Ramadan month as measures of piousness, it is 
hypothesized that the higher the piousness, holding all else constant, the lower the 
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probability of default. Therefore, the tests of these hypotheses for the commercial and 
participation banks in Turkey would help us to understand credit risk dynamics inherent 
in these banks. The findings of this study can be used by not only regulators but also by 
market participants and other bank stakeholders. I used survival analysis techniques to 
test the aforementioned hypotheses. Survival analysis provides the interpretation of 
likelihood of default while it takes survival time into account. 
I employ data set from Central Bank of Republic of Turkey. It includes firm 
loans provided by participation and conventional banks during the sample period 
January 2011 - December 2012. The final sample includes only TRY denominated 
originated loans, resulting in more than 18 million loan-month observations with 
335,088 borrowers getting loans from 4 participation and 40 conventional banks. 
Throughout the thesis, participation loans (banks) and Islamic loans (banks) are used 
interchangeably. 
I find that participation loans are more likely to default compared to 
conventional loans. Loans of firms working with only participation banks are less prone 
to default compared to loans of firms working with participation and conventional 
banks. When the firms that borrow from both types of banks are examined, loans 
belonging to participation banks are again more prone to default than conventional 
loans. Among the firms that borrow from both types of banks, if a firm initially takes a 
loan from conventional bank, then from participation bank, the loan of firm is more 
inclined to default suggesting that borrowers get their loans where they are able to and 
if they are rejected at some point they go for participation banks. Large firm loans 
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survive longer in cities where the population is high, where there are proportionately 
more mosques and more of Al-Quran course participants per population. 
The thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, the terminology and 
different financial instruments in the context of Islamic banking is clarified. In chapter 
3, how customers perceive Islamic banks is explained. In chapter 4, efficiency 
comparison of Islamic and conventional banks is reviewed. These studies related to the 
main focus of this thesis namely credit risk comparison of these banks are presented in 
chapter 5. In chapter 6, Turkish banking system is examined.  Hypotheses, 
methodology and data are discussed in Chapter 7. Empirical findings, robustness 




CHAPTER 2  
ISLAMIC ECONOMICS AND ISLAMIC BANKING 
2.1 Islamic versus Conventional Banking  
The perspective of Islamic finance sets the ground for Islamic banks. Hence, 
how Islamic banks are perceived in the context of Islamic economics provide valuable 
insight for the purpose of comparison. 
Islamic banks follow Sharia principles namely Al-Quran, Hadith (what Prophet 
said word by word), Ijma (consensus of pioneer Muslims or following scholars) and 
Qıyas (reasoned comparison). The major Sharia principles in the context of economics 
are that interest rate in any form, gambling, too speculative actions and religiously 
banned products’ investments (such as alcoholic drink,  pork etc.) are forbidden. The 
prohibition of interest causes Islamic banks to be called “interest free banking” as stated 
in Khan (2010). The money itself is not  a subject of the trade in case of Islamic 
banking (Özulucan and Deran, 2009) rather money is a  tool to finance projects. The 
agreed ratio is pre-determined. Gharar, i.e. excessive uncertainty in transaction, is 
forbidden in Islam. This means that speculative derivatives instruments cannot be used. 
The contract arrangement does not change with the changes in dynamic environment. 
These characteristics differentiate Islamic banks from conventional banks. Islamic 
banks are also different in terms of their moral aspects, ethical concerns, social 
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dimensions (Akkizidis and Khandelwal, 2008). They argue that moral dimension is 
more prominent for Islamic banks. They also plausibly add that Islamic banks have 
ethical and social concerns in addition to financial efficiency. Ali et al. (2010) argue 
that ad hoc basis of contracts, operational costs specific to Sharia compliant contracts 
and divergence of scholars on the topic of derivatives cause some deficiencies for 
Islamic banks.  The current conditions for Islamic banks such as inadequate money and 
secondary security markets in addition to very standard risk management (due to 
derivative limitations) constrain them compared to conventional banks.  
There are studies that investigate whether Islamic banks follow Sharia rules 
(Islamic moral code and religious law) or whether they find ways to manipulate such 
rules. Khan (2010) reports that the issuance of murabaha may be against the Sharia rule 
of risk taking. Advocates argue that use of murabaha with the advancement of banks 
would lessen, yet it is not observed after a decade. It is interesting that even non-profit 
making Islamic Development Bank highly utilizes non-Profit Loss Sharing instruments 
(which are called weakly Islamic by conservative ulema –religious scholars-). They 
make commodity placement transactions such that Islamic bank buys commodity from 
third party then sells by adding markup cost at deferred payment to borrower 
(conventional bank or Islamic bank) and borrower sells the same commodity to third 
party at cost price. Since there occurs a trade and all the parties hold risk (which is 
almost zero by the way), this is argued that it satisfies Sharia rules. Conventional banks 
create similar instruments with the markup cost such as LIBOR rate. Khan (2010) also 
explains some cheatings on accounting information by using directly interest based 
instruments. However, such deceptions cannot be attributed to all Islamic banks yet it 
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raises suspicion. However, Khan(2010) concludes that Islamic banks fail on many 
subjects in terms of Sharia compliance. Sharia boards that are to guide Islamic banks 
seem to be there just to certificate the debatable weak Islamic instruments and 
suspicious bank activities. 
2.2 Instruments Issued by Islamic Banks and/or Under Islamic Rules 
Hassan et al. (2007) classify Islamic banking products as profit and loss sharing 
(PLS) contracts and non-profit and loss sharing agreements (cost plus transactions in 
general).   
Murabaha is cost plus transaction. Bank buys the asset on behalf of borrower, 
after that bank sells the asset at higher price to the borrower via deferred or one-time 
payment. 
Mudaraba is a PLS contract between bank and entrepreneur. There is 
predetermined profit sharing agreement. Bank provides capital only, while entrepreneur 
provides effort. In case of bankruptcy, bank can not impose any penalty unless manager 
is found to be intentionally misbehaved. Presley and Sessions (1994) construct a model 
to show that mudaraba can be more effective than incentive compatible interest contract 
under certain conditions. Their model is based on information asymmetry between 
manager and investor and moral hazard problem after project starts. PLS contract 
would have a problem of managerial effort in bad states, while interest contract would 
have a problem of capital investment in bad states. The reason is that effort comes from 
the manager while capital is given by the bank. Hence during stressed periods, the 
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manager avoids providing extra effort in PLS. In the interest contract, the manager 
makes an optimization for investment and effort because the return of manager is 
connected to return of investment. During stressed periods investment is reduced. It is 
shown that mudaraba would make manager’s compensation dependent on the outcome 
of project.  
Musharaka is also a PLS contract in which the profit shares should be 
determined prior to agreement, but this time both parties are active in management 
decision and provide capital for the project.  
There are other non-PLS instruments as well (Wilson, 2011). Some of the 
popular ones are Salam, İjara leasing and İstisna. Salam refers to financier’s advance 
payment for future delivery. However, nuance is that quality, time and location of 
delivery with transportation arrangement should be pre-determined without any 
ambiguity to prevent speculation. Ijara can be considered as leasing arrangement where 
the ownership remains (or pre-determined sale to lessee at the end of leasing period) yet 
the usage is transferred in exchange for a rent. Damage or loss of product belongs to 
lessor, if the damage is not lessee’s fault. The leasing should be in purpose of trade not 
of speculation. Istisna means buying the product on behalf of a third party. It is used for 
special products.  
There are also other products (sukuk-Islamic bonds, Wakala-empowerment 
contract acting on behalf of third party) to provide financing needs of various parties. 
Sukuk is basically certificate to represent ownership rights for the projects, tangible 
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assets and usufructs (Mauro et al., 2013). Sukuk holders share the profit of the 
underlying asset. Wakala is used for fee based transactions.  
There are some studies examining whether products issued by Islamic banks 
solve some asymmetric information problems (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). They 
point out the debt-like instrument nature of Islamic banks. They construct a model 
based on agency problem where banks have bargaining power in case of default. They 
find that optimal contract in such a setting would be murabaha contract. Therefore more 
severe agency problem would result in more use of such contracts. They argue that 
increase in competition between banks may bring about PLS financing. Prohibition of 
charging interest is also considered as transfer of bargaining power to entrepreneurs 
meaning that it changes distribution of wealth. They also state the short term nature of 
lending is another result of severe agency problem that Islamic banks face with.  
In general, Sharia boards are in place for Islamic banks (Hassan et al., 2007) to 
monitor whether their products are compatible with Sharia law. These boards are found 
to be effective when they act as supervisory rather than advisory boards (Mollaha and 
Zamanb, 2015). 
2.3 History and Today of Islamic Banking  
Islamic banking had started in the mid 1940s in Malaysia and then Pakistan in 
the late 1950s. Egypt experienced this type of banking with the establishment of Mit 
Ghamr Savings Bank in 1963) and Nasser Social Bank in 1971 (Otiti, 2011). In 1973, 
Islamic Development Bank was founded with the purpose of economic improvement 
10 
and social progress of member countries. Since its establishment, Islamic banking has 
been spread around the world. 
As shown in figure 1, Iran and Sudan utilize Islamic banking solely, while the 
other countries have dual banking structures where the share of Islamic banks in terms 
of total banking assets change between 0%  and 51.3%. The share of participation 
banks in total banking assets in Turkey is around 5.7% in the first half of 2014. Islamic 
financial services industry stability report (2015) also emphasizes that there is a strong 
government support in Turkey for the development of the participation banks. The 
share of participation banks in the banking sector is targeted to be 15% in 2023. 
Figure.1 The shares of Islamic Banks in the Banking Sector  by Country 
 




Islamic banks had started to operate in Turkey with the establishment of two 
participation banks in 1985 (Özulucan and Deran, 2009). They are different in the sense 
that they can not open regular deposit accounts or lend loans in Turkey. They are 
permitted to open private current account or participation accounts on liability side and 
provide financing products that are compatible with Sharia rules. Before 2005, these 
banks were called as special finance houses. After 2005 with Banking Law No.5411, 




CHAPTER 3  
ISLAMIC BANKING AND AWARENESS 
How customers perceive the so called Islamic banks would definitely matter in 
terms of risk analyses. The credentials come from procedures followed and instruments 
used by Islamic banks. Reputation is something vulnerable and hard to recover and the 
banking industry can be considered as trust mechanism.  In the context of Islamic 
banking, reputation is linked to perception of the customers about Sharia compliance of 
products that Islamic banks use.   
3.1 Awareness 
It is important to know the clients of Islamic banks and whether they are 
different from those of conventional banks. If only Muslims are the clients of Islamic 
banks, then these banks have a diversification problem in their customer pool. They are 
in a segmented market where only Muslims invest in, if they do not attract non-
Muslims or if individuals are not aware of their products. The empirical findings 
suggest that both Muslims and non-Muslims are aware of their products and use them 
not only for religious reasons but also economic reasons.  
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Rammal and Zurbruegg (2007) investigate awareness of Islamic banking 
products among Muslims in Australia. Majority of respondents are willing to adopt 
helal products of Islamic banks, but they are not well informed about products such as 
possibility of loss in PLS arrangements. Interestingly, some respondents are ready to 
use Islamic banking products, if credit facilities were available. However credit 
facilities are against the Sharia principle because they are interest based.   
Ahmad and Haron (2002) examine corporate customers in Malaysia to 
understand whether individuals are aware of Islamic banking products and services. 
The majority of survey participants are non-Muslims. The results indicate the shortage 
of marketing of these products. They also find that more than fifty five percent of 
customers say that they select Islamic banks because of both religious and economic 
reasons. The economic reasons are cost and profit concerns of these corporate 
customers. 
Abdullah et al (2012) examine the perception of non-Muslim customers towards 
Islamic Banks in Malaysia. Within survey sample, they find that services and products 
are well understood by non-Muslims.  
These findings suggest that non-Muslims are aware of Islamic banks and their 
products. People use their products not only because of religious reasons but also 
economic reasons. It seems that these banks diversify their client portfolio by serving 
both Muslims and non-Muslims.   
14 
3.2 Motivation of Borrowers 
Since banks serve the needs of stake holders (depositors, creditors, shareholders 
and borrowers), the motivation of such parties would matter in order to understand why 
any of such party prefers (or is obliged to use) Islamic bank over the conventional 
counterparty. There can be various motives while the prominent one is profit 
motivation. Similar to Ahmad and Haron (2002), Kader and Leong (2009) show that 
economic factors are important in the client’s choice of Islamic products. They find that 
in a dual banking system where conventional and Islamic banks coexist, interest rate 
seems to be important factor for fund users for the bank. That is, in case of high lending 
rates, borrowers go for Islamic banks whereas they prefer conventional banks in reverse 
conditions when interest rates decline. 
Religious motivation may also trigger stakeholders. In the literature it is 
documented that religion may affect financial decisions and there is relation between 
being religious and risk taking. Miller and Hoffmann (1995) state that negative 
correlation between religion and risk taking can be understood by an analogy that a 
person has nothing to lose if he has faith of God. That is he expects a reward by 
believing in God, without taking any risk. Hess (2012) finds that religiosity matters in 
personal financial decision. Compared to lower level of religiosity based on the 
metropolitan area residency, he finds that risk aversion with a proxy of less bankruptcy 
and higher ethical standards with a proxy of higher credit scores follow higher level of 
religiosity. Jiang et al. (2015) confirm this relationship for family firms in a study 
conducted in China. They classify religions as Western (such as Christianity, Islam and 
Judaism) and Eastern (Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism etc.). This relationship seems to 
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hold for western religions. Based on US study, Hillary and Hui (2009) take this 
relationship a step further, and find that higher religiosity is associated with lower level 
of risk exposure measured with volatility in ROA and ROE. Moreover, they observe 
that CEOs seem to prefer similar religious firms when they change their jobs and move 
to another firm. As another evidence from the US, Baxamusa and Jalal (2014) find 
negative correlation between Protestan religiosity and leverage ratio.  
Hasan et al. (2012) show that profit, religion and service quality are criteria for 
the selection of Islamic banks in Pakistan. Özsoy et al. (2013) find that product and 
service quality is prominent factor in individual’s preference of participation banks in 
Turkey. The other factors are trust, personnel quality and religious motivations. 
However it is notable that different business model applied by Islamic banks seems not 
granting to exert market power (Weill, 2011). That is, Islamic banks do not charge 
higher prices for their products due to providing Sharia compliant products. 
Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2011) examine factors affecting the bank type 
choice of firms in Turkey using multinomial logit model. Their loan-firm level data 
come from Kompass for 2008 with 10,170 complete firm quarterly records. They find 
that young firms, firms with multiple bank relationships, industry based and transparent 
firms more likely to engage in Islamic banks. Several questions can be raised based on 
their findings. For example, do young firms willingly engage in Islamic banks or do not 
they have any other option? That is, it might be the case that Islamic banks are dealing 
with firms not accepted by conventional banks due to risk concerns.   
16 
 
CHAPTER 4  
EFFICIENCY OF ISLAMIC BANKS 
Bank efficiency is measured as relative distance of outputs and inputs compared 
to best practices. In the literature, three methods are used to measure efficiency of 
banks. The first one is called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA henceforth). It is a non-
parametric method which optimizes performance of each production unit. The second 
method is parametric method namely Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) which 
benefits from optimized regression via decision making units. These methods differ in 
terms of making a functional assumption and power of statistical test. DEA does not 
make any functional assumptions yet it lacks power. The third method is financial ratios 
approach (FRA henceforth) (Bader et al., 2008). It uses traditional financial ratios as 
proxies for profitability, revenue and cost efficiency of banks, such as return on average 
assets, net interest margin and cost-to-income ratio, respectively.  
4.1 Definition and Approaches 
The problem in efficiency studies is the definition of input and output. Input, 
input price and output definitions are important to estimate efficiency. Two approaches 
are widely used to identify input, input price and output variables. Production approach 
is widely used to examine efficiency of bank branches. It views intermediaries as 
producers of service to customers (Ahmad et al., 2010). They indicate that inputs are 
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costs of labor and material (physical), whereas outputs are services provided to 
customers and can be represented by number of bank transactions for a time period. 
Intermediary approach views financial institutions as intermediary between lenders and 
borrowers. In this approach deposits, labor and material can be considered as input 
variables. Output variables are loans and investments.  
Efficiency measured using DEA is cost efficiency. Isik and Hassan (2002) 
define cost efficiency as proportional reduction in cost if bank uses right combination 
of inputs given prices (allocative efficiency) and if bank reduces input usage by being 
in efficient frontier (technical efficiency). Technical efficiency is further decomposed 
into pure technical efficiency (reduction in input by not wasting input) and scale 
efficiency (whether constant returns to scale are reached). 
The studies that examine the efficiency of Islamic banks can be classified into 
two: those that examine banks in different countries and those that examine this issue 
within a country. In summary, the findings depend on the efficiency measure and the 
estimation technique used in the analyses. Therefore, the comparative efficiency of 
Islamic banks is highly contingent upon the methodology used. However, in general, it 
is found that small Islamic banks are too small in terms of scale and they will benefit 
economies of scale if they become bigger. Their reaction to global crises differed. It is 
found that their efficiency declined during the 1998-1999 crisis whereas they improved 
their efficiency during the 2008-2009 crisis. Finally, Sharia compliance of Islamic 
banks may explain some of reductions in their output or decline in their efficiency. 
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4.2 Empirical Findings of Islamic Bank Efficiency 
Ahmad et al (2010) analyze efficiency of Islamic banks with DEA over 25 
countries during the period 2003-2009. Data come from BankScope and cover 77 
Islamic banks, including three participation banks operating in Turkey. They find that 
mean technical efficiency of Islamic banks is 66%. It means that 34% of inputs are 
wasted by those banks. It is also shown that during the crisis period of 2008 -2009, the 
technical efficiency of Islamic banks seems to increase. They find that these banks are 
small in low income countries and they can achieve more efficiency by increasing their 
scale. Another finding is that large Islamic banks either have constant returns or 
decreasing returns to scale indicating that they may be too large.  
Yudistira (2004) investigates 18 Islamic banks from different countries between 
1997 and 2000 by using Data Envelopment analysis and intermediation approach. He 
defines three inputs and outputs same as Ahmad et al (2010). He finds that 
inefficiencies are small during the period analyzed, around 10%; Islamic banks seem to 
be negatively affected from the 1998-1999 global crisis but not from the challenging 
periods after that; They suggest merger and acquisitions of small banks because they 
find increasing returns to scale for small banks. The market power of a bank, defined as 
deposit share of each bank in the banking sector, is high in Middle East is found 
insignificant factor in explaining efficiency. He justifies these findings by the recent 
establishment of Islamic banks in this region.  
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Bader et al (2007) compare the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks, by 
using a different method, namely financial ratio approach. Their sample includes 90 
banks, 43 of them are Islamic banks and from 21 countries. They find in general no 
significant difference between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of their 
efficiency. However, both types of banks are found to be inefficient in terms of 
profitability, cost and revenue.  
Abdul-Majid et al (2010) compare the efficiency of Islamic and conventional 
banks during the period 1996-2002. They utilize output distance functions arguing that 
different accounting standards among countries may distort profit and cost distance 
functions. They find that output of Islamic banks is 12.7% lower than conventional 
banks but it is not due to managerial inefficiency. They argue that Sharia-compliance 
may create a different structure for Islamic banks leading to lower output. For all banks, 
the average potential output is around 20%, higher than the realized output.  
There are several studies that investigate the efficiency of Islamic and 
conventional banks in a specific region or a single country. Hassan et al. (2009) 
compare Islamic and conventional banks in the Middle East Region. They find that both 
type of banks are worse in terms of revenue efficiency than in terms of profit efficiency. 
Conventional-Islamic banks are not found to be different in terms of efficiency 
measures.  
Mokhtar et al (2006) compare technical and cost efficiency of Islamic banks and 
conventional banks in Malaysia for the period 1997-2003, using Stochastic Frontier 
Approach. They find that efficiency of Islamic banks increased during this period yet 
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these banks are less efficient than conventional banks. They also distinguish Islamic 
windows of conventional banks. Islamic windows are managed by Sharia principles and 
as a separate fund. These Islamic windows of conventional banks are found to be less 
efficient than Islamic banks.  
Arslan and Ergec (2010) investigate efficiency of banks in Turkey using DEA 
analysis. They compare technical efficiency of conventional and participation banks for 
the period 2006-2009 using the data from Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) and 
Participation Banks Association of Turkey. They find that efficiency of participation 
banks improved in 2009 compared to 2006. They argue that this is consistent with 
expectation, since 2006 is the year when conventional and participation banks have 
same regulation (Banking law no. 5411). Special Finance Houses have turned into 
participation banks by this law. They also show that participation banks are better than 
conventional counterparts in terms of efficiency during their sample period.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 RISKS IN LOANS ISSUED BY ISLAMIC VERSUS 
CONVENTIONAL BANKS 
The structure or use of Islamic principles or different products raises the 
question of whether risks inherent in the business model of Islamic banks are different 
from those of conventional banks. Credit risk, market risk, operational risk and liquidity 
(especially deposit withdrawal risk for Islamic banks) risk should be taken into 
consideration in order to understand the premises and challenges of Islamic banks.  
5.1 Risks in General 
Čihák and Hesse (2010) delve into the question of whether the stability of 
Islamic banks differs. They utilize z-scores and various control variables in a panel 
setting. Their sample period is between 1993 and 2004. They examine 77 Islamic and 
397 conventional banks with 520 and 3248 observations respectively. Bank level 
control variables are asset size of banks, cost-income ratio, loans over assets. Income 
structure of banks is controlled via income diversity from traditional lending activities. 
On the country level, GDP growth rate, inflation rate and exchange rate are used as 
control variables. Herfindahl index is also included in the model to account for market 
concentration. The governance effect is measured with an index covering political 
stability, government effectiveness, quality of regulations, rule of law and corruption 
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 percentiles in their analysis. They find 
no significant difference between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of their z-
scores. When they examine small and large banks separately, they observe that large 
Islamic banks are less stable but small Islamic banks are more stable than their 
conventional counterparts. 
Abedifar et al (2013) investigate whether credit and insolvency risks change by 
the types of banks (Islamic, Islamic window, Conventional), and whether Islamic banks 
extract rents from customers by offering Islamic products and services. The period is 
between 1999 and 2009 and banks are from 24 countries that are members of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation. First, they estimate models of credit risk, 
insolvency risk, and bank interest rate by using proxies loan loss reserves to gross 
loans, Z-score and net interest margin for interest extraction, respectively. They use 
several control variables, including ownership structure, bank age, macro-economic 
indicators, and year and country dummy variables. Overall they find that small Islamic 
more leveraged (lower capital to asset ratio) banks and the banks in countries with high 
rate of Muslim population have lower credit risk than credit risk of conventional banks. 
Arguably they claim that risk aversion of religious people leads to lower credit risk. 
Small Islamic banks are also superior in terms of insolvency risk. There is little (not-
robust) evidence that Islamic banks charges higher interest for loans and lower interest 
rates for deposits in providing Islamic instruments and services. Conventional banks 
seem to be more prone to domestic interest rate risk in terms of loan quality compared 
to Islamic banks. 
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Kader and Leong (2009) investigate how the demand for Islamic financing 
changes with the change in interest rate in Malaysia where both Islamic and 
conventional banks operate. They hypothesize that when lending rate increases 
borrowers would go to Islamic banks because of profit motivation, the reverse happens 
in case of decline in interest rates. They use time series analysis techniques such as 
VAR, Granger causality and Impulse response function. They examine total residential 
property loans issued by conventional banks and of Islamic banks and base lending rate. 
The findings are consistent with their hypothesis. They suggest that interest-free Islamic 
banks are exposed to interest rate risk. 
Ergeç and Arslan (2013) hypothesize that Islamic banks are insensitive to 
changes in interest rates. They use interbank overnight interest rates, consumer price 
index, industrial production index, total loans and deposits of conventional and 
participation banks and real exchange rate. All variables are found to be integrated of 
order one. Impulse response functions show that an increase in interest rate negatively 
affects deposits of Islamic banks while positively affects loans of Islamic banks. 
Overall, they find that various interest rates affect Islamic banks instruments’ rates in 
Turkey with vector error correction model.  
5.2 Credit Risk  
Credit risk is associated with not fulfilling the requirements of debt contracts by 
either delaying principal and/or interest payment or by not meeting the certain promised 
covenants. It is also called default risk or sovereign risk. They are related with the 
ability of governments or issuers to fulfill their debt obligations.  
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Credit risk arises from moral hazard problem. Due to the information 
asymmetry, fund provider may not be able to control fund user throughout the project.  
In case of divergence from project in a risky manner, it may lead to default or 
worsening of financial situation. Banks as financial intermediaries are to manage such 
moral hazard issues.  
Islamic and conventional banks offer different products and probably to 
different pool of customers. There might be some differences in their risk dynamics.  
Song and Oosthuizen (2014) point out this issue. Islamic banks might have higher 
credit risk, since interest rate can not be charged for a default of borrower other than 
deliberate intent. Moreover, limited customer base and concentration should also be 
considered. However, Islamic banks might face with lower credit risk because banks 
may transfer part of their credit risk to depositors with profit and loss sharing contracts 
(How et al., 2005). Moreover, religion may be prevalent in the sense that only highly 
religious people who are assumingly less prone to default work with Islamic banks 
(Abedifar et al., 2013). Therefore, it is not clear whether Islamic banks hold more or 
less credit risk compared to conventional banks.  
In empirical studies, three variables are extensively used to compare credit risk 
of banks: (1)Non performing loans ratio (NPL) as a measure of ex-post credit risk, (2) 
Z-scores, calculated using accounting ratios, (3) Distance to default method, a market 
based method, measured with the number of standard deviations for market value of 
assets of banks to reach the level of default which is equal to book value of liability 
(Kabir et al., 2015)  
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In a study conducted in Pakistan between 2002 and 2010, Zaheer et al. (2013) 
consistent with Baele et al. (2014) find that indicators like NPLs and loan loss 
provisions to gross loans ratios for Islamic banking institutions are lower compared to 
the ratios of conventional banks. They use z-score for insolvency risk. For the asset 
quality, non-performing loans over gross loans and provisioning to gross loans are used. 
They find the asset quality of Islamic banks is better compared to those of conventional 
banks.  
Saeed and Izzeldin (2014) show that there is a connection between efficiency 
and risk. They use stochastic frontier approach and Merton’s distance to default model 
to measure efficiency and risk, respectively. They apply panel vector autoregressive 
model to understand the relationship between efficiency and risk. They have 
unbalanced panel of 106 publicly listed banks from eight countries for the period 2002 -
2010. Turkey is not included in their sample. They control for country effects with 
variables such as market concentration (assets of three largest banks), loan 
intermediation (Total Loans /Total deposits), GDP per capita and population density. 
They state five hypotheses that may explain efficiency and stability relationship. The 
first hypothesis is bad luck hypothesis. They argue that since Islamic banks can not 
charge penalties in case of defaults, the riskier borrowers may prefer Islamic banks. 
This leads to increase in cost inefficiency due to the fact that more monitoring is 
required. The second hypothesis which is called as moral hazard is about higher risk-
higher inefficiency paradigm. Managers may follow an expansionary stage and take 
more risks. The third hypothesis is skimping hypothesis. Managers may hinder their 
risks by increasing asset size or restructuring non-performing loans. Since PLS products 
26 
in Islamic banks share losses, bank managers may abuse this by increasing loan amount 
excessively. In case of high inefficiency-low default risk framework, the fourth 
hypothesis namely risk averse management might be relevant. Risk averse managers 
may want to be on safe side by reducing risky investments (probably more profitable 
investments at the same time) and increasing monitoring costs. Finally bad management 
hypothesis claims that incompetent managers fail to control the risks and also fail to 
increase efficiency. They find that distance to default reduces (i.e. risk increase) when 
cost efficiency increases. This finding may imply that risk management is sacrificed for 
cost efficiency.  The other finding is that profit efficiency is positively associated with 
higher financial instability (higher risk of default) except for Islamic banks. Islamic 
banks have this relationship at weaker level. Islamic banks can improve their profit 
efficiency while holding their default risk at a stable level. Saeed and Izzeldin (2014) 
discuss that this exception may occur due to investment accounts special to Islamic 
banks which are related to Profit Loss Sharing paradigm.  
Kabir et al. (2015) consistent with Baele et al. (2014) use different credit risk 
proxies (especially favoring Merton’s distance-to-default (DD) model, NPL ratio, z-
score) to evaluate credit risks of conventional and Islamic banks operating in 13 
countries for the period between 2000 and 2012. They find that DD model implies 
lower credit risk for Islamic banks, while other accounting measures propose the 
opposite relationship. In their model, they control for asset size, asset growth, cost-to-
income ratio and other bank specific characteristics, in addition to country control 
variables, such as GDP, inflation and concentration. 
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Beck et al. (2013) find that asset quality, capital ratio, asset intermediation is 
higher for Islamic banks. They also find that conventional banks are more cost 
effective. They measure quality by using loss provisions, loss reserves and non-
performing loans over gross loans as credit risk indicators for the period of 1995-2009 
including 510 banks across 22 countries. They also look at business orientation. They 
use loan to deposit ratio, fee-based income over total income and non-deposit funding 
to total funding as proxies for business orientation. Cost-income ratio and overhead cost 
are two indicators used to measure bank efficiency.  For the bank stability, liquidity 
ratio, z-score, capital to asset ratio are adopted. 
Glennon and Nigro (2005) investigate credit risk of small business loans with 
the framework of discrete time hazard model for a period of 1983-1998. Although they 
did not compare Islamic banks with conventional banks, they examine size of borrower. 
They use borrower, lender and loan characteristics in the model. Lender characteristics 
include but not limited to loan originator and less information is required. Among 
borrower characteristics, there are firm size (number of employees), firm status (new-
old) and industrial classification. Loan attributes are such as type of interest rate, 
approval amount, whether sold in secondary market. Moreover, they also include time 
specific and macro-economic conditions. They find that time dependency of default is 
distinct. New businesses, large firms and firms with higher guarantee percentages are 
found to be more risky in terms hazard rates. 
Baele et al. (2014) compare default rates of Islamic and conventional loans 
taken by firms. They assume that more religious people will take loans from Islamic 
banks. Based on the hypothesis that religious customers would be loyal to their debts, 
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default rates are expected to be lower in Islamic loans. The other hypothesis is that the 
moral motivation would affect pious customer to default on conventional loan before 
Islamic loan. Finally, the third hypothesis is the higher the piousness or connectedness 
(network effect) is the lower the default rate. In an analysis conducted in Pakistan 
during 2006-2008, it is found that default is less likely for Islamic loans, so the result is 
consistent with the abovementioned hypotheses. Moreover, during Ramadan and where 
religious party voters are majority, defaults are found to be less likely. Their findings 
are robust to the technique used in the analysis, including logit, Weibull hazard model 
and Cox proportional hazard model. They control for loan characteristics, such as 
collateral, purpose of financing (agriculture, export etc.) and maturity; borrower 
characteristics, size of borrowers, regions, whether borrowers use both conventional 
and Islamic banks, bank types (state, foreign etc.) and city features such as population, 
share of conservative party votes. In this thesis, I test their hypotheses for the 
conventional and participation (Islamic) banks operating in Turkey. 
In summary, the comparison of Islamic and conventional banks in terms of 
credit risk in different analyses with different measures shows that there is no direct 
answer whether one type of bank is more risky in terms of credit risk. Firm size, proxy 
selection for credit risk such as NPL ratio, distance-to-default, loan loss provisions ratio 
and probability of default of individual loans demonstrates different results in terms of 
comparative credit risk. Further analyses at micro level enhance the insight of dynamics 




CHAPTER 6  
BANKS AND BANKING REGULATION IN TURKEY  
6.1 Banks in Turkey 
The Turkish financial system is dominated by banks. According to Banks in 
Turkey 2014 report (2015), total asset share of banks over total financial assets is 
around 86% as of December 2013.  As of May 2015, there are 50 banks operating in the 
Turkish banking system: four private participation banks, three state deposit banks, 13 
investment and development banks and 30 deposit banks. Recently, a state participation 
bank was established. Participation banks operate under Islamic principles as Islamic 
banks.  
Several characteristics of Turkish banking sector and participation banks are 
reported in Table 1. The asset share of participation banks hovers around 5%. The 
intermediation level of Islamic banks is close to the level of conventional banks for the 
sample period of 2011-2012 in terms of loans to total deposits ratio. Sharia compliance 
limits the amount of government assets invested by participation banks. Because of the 
issuance of sukuk by the government, the share of government securities in the 
portfolio of Islamic banks increased over the last two years.  
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Figure 2 presents the annual loan growth rate of deposit, participation banks and 
banking sector for the period 2006-2015. The annual average loan growth rate of 
banking sector has declined from 51.4% in 2006 to 21.7% in 2015 because of macro 
prudential measures taken by CBRT and BRSA. Loan to value regulations, caps on 
loans and credit cards, reserve option mechanism, and extending reserve requirements 
to finance companies are some of the macro prudential measures taken. Except for the 
last two years, participation banks were able to grow even during crisis period. Figure 3 
shows the loan share of participation and deposit banks for the period 2006-2015. The 
loan share of participation banks has increased from 4.2% in 2006 to 5.1% in 2015. 
Figure.2: Annual Loan Growth (%) Figure.3: Loan Share (%) 
  



































































































































Deposit Participation (Right Axis)
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According to Table 2, profitability of conventional banks became more 
prominent over the years compared to participation banks. Interest revenues scaled by 
total assets may signal that Islamic banks do not charge extra rents from the customers, 
which is consistent with the findings of Abedifar et al. (2013). This is especially true 
for the recent periods. Moreover, participation banks seem to improve their operational 
efficiency by reducing their operational expense to total assets ratio but their ratio is 
still higher than that of conventional banks.   
In terms of liquidity risk and withdrawal risk, there are differences between 
participation and deposit banks. As Figure 4 demonstrates, term deposits-to-total 
deposits ratio indicates higher volatility for participation banks. Moreover, demand 
deposits have higher share in the context of participation banks implying higher 
withdrawal risk. While almost half of deposits of conventional banks are from high 
volume deposits, only one third of deposit amount is over TRY 1 million in case of 
participation banks (Figure 5). These banks hold more liquid assets as shown in Figure 
6, possibly for two reasons. Inadequacy of derivative instruments and regulations 
specific to Islamic banks may limit their hedging activities. Moreover, demand deposits 
which can be withdrawn on demand are relatively high in Islamic banks.  Foreign 
exchange risk is also important to consider. Banking regulation imposes limits on the 




Figure.4:Term Deposits/ Total 
Deposits 
Figure.5: High volume deposits/Total 
deposits  
  
Source: BRSA Statistics Source: BRSA Statistics 
 
Figure.6: Liquidity Requirement 
Ratio (%) 
Figure.7: Net FX Position/Regulatory 
Capital (%) 
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One of the credit risk indicators is non-performing loans to gross loans ratio. 
Non-performing loans are the loans which are overdue 90 days. Figure 8 indicates that 
participation bank loans are in general more prone to default. There can be various 
reasons for the higher NPL ratios of participation banks, such as composition of loans 
and moral hazard hypothesis. If the loan portfolio is composed of more risky assets 
such as loans to SMEs, R&D firms etc., then the risk of default increases, holding all 
else constant.  
Figure. 8: NPL ratios of Participation 
and Deposit Banks 
 
Source: BRSA Statistics 
 
SME loans are important in the sense of diversification benefits. Shaban et al. 
(2014) show that small banks are more enthusiastic about lending to SMEs compared to 
large banks. The moral hazard hypothesis, proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
seems to be valid for Islamic banks. They hypothesize that if the bank is 
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find that in Indonesia, Islamic banks are less capitalized compared to conventional 
banks. It is observed in Turkey as well. The relative undercapitalization of participation 
banks in Turkey can be seen at Figure 12. Small firms are more likely to get their loans 
from participation banks than conventional banks (Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü, 2011). 
The increase in the share of SME loans in the participation banks since 2006 supports 
these explanations. 
Figure.9: SME Loans /Total Loans 
(%) 
Figure.10: SME NPL/Total SME 
Loans (%) 
  
Source: BRSA Statistics Source: BRSA Statistics 
  
Loan loss provisions are the amount allotted as expense for non-performing 
loans. Farook et al. (2014) investigate the connection between loan loss provisioning 
and profit distribution management for Islamic banks. They find that loan loss 
provisions are consistently low and there seems an evidence for such connection. It 
seems that participation banks use loan loss provisions to manage profit distribution 
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for Turkey is also parallel with the findings of Farook et al. (2014). Moreover, it is 
notable that the capital adequacy ratios of both types of banks are well above both 
minimum ratio (8%) and target ratio (%12). 
Figure.11: Loan Loss 
Provisions/Gross Non-Performing 
Loans (%) 
Figure.12: Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(%) 
  
Source: BRSA Statistics Source: BRSA Statistics 
6.2 Banking Regulation in Turkey 
Banking Law No: 5411, enacted in 2005, regulates banks, financial holdings, 
banking regulation and supervision agency (BRSA), banks associations and savings 
deposit insurance fund. According to this law, special finance houses are turned into 
participation banks. Participation banks can not accept deposits, while conventional 
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The regulation on credit operations of banks which was published in the Official 
Gazette Nr. 26333 dated November 01, 2006, defines six financing instruments that 
participation banks can use instead of time deposits or interest bearing loans. The first 
two methods are corporate and individual financing supports. With these supports, 
participation banks purchase the product on behalf of customer, and sell it to the 
customer with a mark-up cost. The third method is profit and loss sharing investment. 
The project profit is shared between the two parties with the terms of the contract. 
However, the profit is not guaranteed and no clause that guarantees profit is specified in 
the contract. As the fourth instrument, financial leasing is used to lease machinery, 
equipment or other fixed items. The financing commodity against document is the fifth 
method to finance fund users. Finally, participation banks can provide capital as a 
partner in the sixth method of “joint investments” with some limitations. Some of the 
limitations are a maximum of seven years of investment and 15% cap on investment 
share in terms of own funds of bank. 
The regulation numbered 26333 also specifies the procedures and principles in 
determining the qualifications of loans and other receivables and the provisions to be 
set aside by banks. According to this regulation, banks are required to classify their 
loans and other receivables into five categories according to their default risk. The first 
level (the least risky) is for regular loans which are expected to be paid at maturity. The 
second group is the loans whose borrowers are capable to repay back for now but there 
is a downward trend for their capacity to pay. These loans require close monitoring. 
The third group is for loans which are overdue by 90 days but less than 180 days. The 
fourth group of loans is the ones not paid back after 180 days of the maturity but not 
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more than 1 year. The loans in Group 5 are considered as “having the nature of loss”. 
Therefore, the loans in this group are not paid back even one year after their maturity. 
The loans in groups 3, 4 and 5 compose of non-performing loans.  
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CHAPTER 7  
HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
7.1 Hypotheses 
The motivations for the preference of Islamic loans raise the question of 
whether similar type of loans given by conventional and Islamic banks show similar 
characteristics in terms of default. Regarding Baele et al.(2014), the choice of taking 
credit from a certain type of bank can be tested via its default characteristics. Religious 
motivation for similar types of loans is considered to be important. Therefore, in a 
world where there are pious and secular borrowers and where there is two type of banks 
(conventional versus Islamic), we have a probability of selection of a bank and 
probability of acceptance. That is, a person with a desire of taking a loan has a certain 
level of piousness. This person either goes for conventional bank or Islamic bank 
(There is no Islamic window of conventional bank in the context of Turkey). Then, 
there is probability of acceptance of such loan request. Finally, the received loan either 
matures or defaults.  
Like Baele et al. (2014), I will test three hypotheses for a sample of firm loans 
in Turkey. The first hypothesis implies that participation loans are less prone to default. 
The second hypothesis is that dual borrower, who borrows from conventional and 
participation bank, is more loyal to participation loan. That is, in case of borrowing 
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from two types of banks, participation loans are less likely default. The third hypothesis 
tests the higher the piousness is, holding all else constant, lower the probability of 
default. Unlike Baele et al. (2014) I would expect to see different results when I test the 
hypotheses in Turkey. The reason is that Turkish government aims to increase market 
share of participation banks. This aim may make participation banks to be more 
aggressive in granting loans. Moreover, the assumption that participation banks lend 
more proportionately to religious borrowers is a strict assumption. This assumption may 
not hold since several studies indicate that non-Muslims are getting these products 
because of their economic motivation. 
7.2 Methodology – Survival Analysis 
I test these three hypotheses of Baele et al. (2014) by comparing default 
probability of firm loans granted by participation and conventional banks using survival 
analysis.  
Loan default has two outcomes: default (failure) or non-default (censoring due 
to out of sample period non-observation or paid back). Such failure analysis can be 
implemented via survival (duration) analysis methodology. Jenkins (2005) describes the 
survival analysis as moving along probabilistic states, a certain number of observations 
fail to move (do not go next state). Such failure to move may be because of having spell 
(default, die, or any other transition to event) or because of exiting from study for other 
reason (censoring or truncation). 
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Survival, failure and hazard functions are among important concepts in survival 
analysis. Survival function can be considered as the probability of surviving up to a 
certain period while failure function is the cumulative probability of failing up to a 
certain period (Ibrahim, 2005). Let “t” indicates a certain period and “spell” is 
transition of event then, hazard function simply is “the conditional probability of having 
a spell length of exactly t, conditional on survival up to time t” (Jenkins, 2005). Failure, 
survival and hazard function can be shown as follows (Jenkins, 2005). 
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝑃𝑟(𝑇 ≤  𝑡)  =  𝐹(𝑡) 





where T: continuous random variable  
t: duration (elapsed time) 
f(t)= probability density function of T 
F(T)=cumulative distribution function of T 
The survival analysis is used extensively in medical studies. However, any type 
of event transition over time can be modeled in this context. Loan or bank defaults are 
examples of its use in finance. One important problem with the survival observations is 
that limited sample period does not allow observing every transition of observation 
(loans, banks or patients). Therefore, one does not know what happened to the 
observation before or after the sample period. This limitation is called censoring. Right 
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censoring occurs when the information about the survival time is not known at the end 
of sample period, while left censoring is not knowing the observation up to analysis 
period such as loan of previously defaulted borrower. Another problem with survival 
data is truncation which is related to sample selection (Cook, 2008). As an example to 
left truncation, sample of previously defaulted borrower without knowing the default 
date precisely can be selected for analysis. One might argue that such censored 
observations can be excluded. However, those observations may have some 
characteristics (valuable information for population), so they should be included in the 
sample.  
Although it is possible to restrict survival function with an assumed distribution 
to estimate hazard ratio, more direct analysis might be to impose a restriction on 
functional form of hazard ratio itself (Greene, 2003). Hazard model consists of two type 
of covariates. The first type of covariate is baseline hazard –duration dependence- (time 
dependent hazard). It shows the effect of passage of survival time on hazard rate. The 
other type of covariate includes time varying (age, duration etc.) or fixed (maturity, 
birth of place etc.) variables. Based on duration dependence assumption whether hazard 
increases, decreases or stays same over time, different types of distributions are 
possible. While fixed effects of certain characteristic can be used to control for time 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity, it is not possible to find every characteristic such as 
skill. In order to control for such effects, shared frailty with an assumption on 
distribution can be used.  
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There are two different ways to interpret hazard ratios. Proportional hazard 
model (PH) demonstrates that for a particular period, independent variables 
proportionally differ in terms of hazard ratio. Accelerated failure time (AFT) implies 
that given the hazard ratio how time changes for a particular independent variable 
(Jenkins, 2005). For example, if survival of twins where one has the disease and the 
other has not is compared, it can be seen that relative time of reaching death would be 
faster for the diseased person. Jenkins (2005) mentions that Weibull distribution is 
appropriate in both AFT and PH with the advantage of flexible duration dependence. 
In summary three factors, which are censoring, time varying covariates and 
structural modeling, characterize survival data and imply that OLS model is 
inappropriate while logit/probit (binary models) requires modification (Jenkins, 2005). 
He argues that OLS is deficient in case of survival analysis, since censored observations 
are considered as if they are complete. Another problem is that OLS treats observations 
as independent, while observations experience effects as time goes by as in time series. 
For example, a loan characteristic such as current value or remaining maturity may 
change over time which is called as time varying covariate.  Binary models are also 
inadequate for time varying covariates without modification. In discrete analysis, logit 
model with time dummies or other baseline hazard specifications takes passage of time 
into account. Hence time dummies or other baseline hazard specifications are required 
as modification to use binary models. The estimated coefficients in logit models can be 
transformed into odds ratios to interpret economic significance. 
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Among various methods for survival analysis, I use continuous parametric 
(Weibull) model consistent with Baele et al. (2014). As a robustness check, I compare 
results with discrete complementary log-log regression while accounting for duration 
dependence. I do not use cox proportional hazard model, since it is computationally 
burdensome given the size of sample for this thesis. I use Stata program for the analyses 
and benefit from Stata Survival Analysis And Epidemiological Tables Reference 
Manual Release 13 (2013). I use survival analysis techniques because average loan 
amount weighted maturity of loans in my sample is around 1.5 year. The maturity of 
47% of loan-month observations exceeds the end of sample period (right censored). 
There exists serious right censoring problem. Therefore right censoring should be 
carefully taken into account in this analysis by using survival analysis techniques. 
The general continuous model which includes both time varying covariates 
(note subscript “t”) and shared frailty (unobserved heterogeneity in survival analysis) 
for proportional hazard is shown below consistent with Jenkins (2005). 
 
𝜃(𝑡, 𝑋𝑡| 𝜗) = 𝜗 ∗ 𝜃0(𝑡) ∗ exp(𝛽
′𝑋𝑡) = 𝜗 ∗ 𝜃0(𝑡) ∗ 𝜆    (1) 
Where   𝜃0(𝑡) = Baseline hazard which depends on time (t) 
𝑋𝑡= Loan specific time independent variables and time varying 
covariates  
𝜗 = Shared frailty term 
𝜆= Proportional hazard term 
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For three hypotheses, I use following continuous model specifications.  
Hypothesis 1: Null. Participation loan is equally likely to default compared to 
conventional loan. 





𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑡 +
𝛽𝑚 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡 +








Hypothesis 2: Null. Participation loan is equally likely to default compared to 
conventional loan for the same borrower. 
 





𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑡 +
𝛽𝑚 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡 +








Hypothesis 3: Null. Participation loan is equally likely to default compared to 
conventional loan as piousness changes. 
 







𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑡 +
𝛽𝑚 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡 +
𝛽ℎ ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑡 +











The dependent variable is hazard rate in continuous model. In the baseline 
continuous model, loans that are overdue at least 90 days are considered as failure. “α” 
is duration dependence (baseline hazard dependent on time)  term which shows the 
effect of survival time on hazard rate. 
  “LoanChar” denotes loan characteristics. It includes the type of loan such that if 
it is participation loan then part_loan takes value of one. There are also other 
characteristics namely maturity, and whether loan is collateralized (collateral), the 
natural logarithm of loan amount (lnloan_amount), the interest rate or mark-up rate of 
loans for conventional and participation banks, respectively (intrate).   
“BorrChar” represents the characteristics of the borrowing firm. They include 
its size (lnsize), a dummy variable indicating whether a firm takes one or more loans 
during the sample period (diff), a dummy variable indicating whether a borrower gets a 
loan from more than one bank (multiplebank), and other dummy variables indicating 
whether borrower get its first loan from a conventional bank or from a participation 
bank (consenior and parsenior respectively). There are also dummies if a borrower 
borrows only from participation bank (borr_participation), if a borrower borrows only 
from conventional bank (borr_convent) and if a borrower borrows from conventional 
and participation bank (twotype). Large firm dummy (large_firm) indicates one if sum 
of all loans granted is greater than those of other firms at 75
th
 percentile. Small firm 
dummy indicates one if sum of all loans granted is less than those of other firms at 25
th
 
percentile. The definition and descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 
6.   
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“BankChar” represents bank characteristics controlled in the model. They are 
dummy variables indicating the type of a bank: state bank, participation bank, 
investment bank, large bank, foreign bank. The foreign participation banks are not 
included in foreign bank definition. Large bank is a dummy variable which takes value 
of one if the bank asset size in a period greater than the asset sizes of other banks at 75
th
 
percentile.  The definition and descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in 
Table 6.   
 “CityPeriodChar” indicates control variables such as an indication for Ramadan 
month (ramadan), density of mosques in a city (more_mosque and less_mosque), 
population of city (bigcity) and Al-Quran course participants per population 
(more_coursier, less coursier) in a city. The latter three control variables are proxies for 
piousness or network effect. These control variables are dummy variables taking value 
of 1 if city has more mosques per population, more population or more course 
participants per population than other cities at 75
th




The fixed effects of city (city), time (year-month), use of loan such as 
agriculture, mining and construction etc. (Financing) are controlled as well.  
In the baseline model, I employ loan, borrower and bank characteristics, year-
month, financing and city fixed effects. The models are applied at different samples. 
They are run separately for large and small firms  since participation banks give loans 
to small firms. I also estimate these models for banks with similar size by excluding 
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large banks to have comparable bank sizes. In order to test the second hypothesis, dual 
borrowers are used in the analysis.  
7.3 Data 
The loan and bank data are obtained from Central Bank of Republic of Turkey 
(CBRT). The population data in 2011 is from Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). 
Mosque numbers and course attendees of Al-Quran courses for the city data as of 
December 2014 are obtained from Presidency of Religious Affairs of Republic of 
Turkey. The monthly loan data covers business loans between the January 2011 and 
December 2012.  
In the analysis, only loans that are originated within the sample period are used. 
Ten digit tax id information is used to exclude non-business loans. The analysis solely 
focuses on TRY loans. Therefore, FX loans and FX indexed loans are also excluded. 
Moreover based on the financing codes, the loans that are particularly related to 
governmental activities and loans granted to international institutions are excluded as 
shown in Table 3.  Final dataset concludes with more than 4 million loans with more 
than 18.5 million loan-month observations given by 4 participation and 40 conventional 
banks (private, foreign, investment and state banks) to 335,088 borrowers. Since loan id 
information was missing in the dataset, so the identification of loans is required. It is 
assumed that the loan would be considered same over the period if it is granted by same 
bank branch, at same original maturity and beginning date, with same financing code to 
an exact id (according to tax identity code). The limitation is that there may be more 
than one loan in the same period with same characteristics. In order to account for this, 
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another assumption was imposed. In this assumption throughout the period, the 
duplicate loan month observations are grouped together based on the loan amount. In 
order to adjust possible misreporting errors, extreme values (such as 1000% interest 
rate) are winsorized at 99
th 
percentile.      
Default variable is defined in two ways. First, the loan is called default if it is 90 
days overdue (def_loan). Second, the loan is called default if it is overdue 180 days 
(def_loan2). As shown in Table 4, total of 2.8% loans defaulted under the first 
definition of default. The sector default ratio is 1.9% in case of 180 days overdue. 
Default ratio of participation loans are higher compared to conventional loans. Only 
small number of loans is the single loan outstanding for a borrower, especially for a 
borrower borrowing from participation bank. That is; there is more than one loan for a 
borrower in general. Participation loans have shorter maturity and lower interest rate. 
These banks give more favorable loan degree to the borrowers compared to 
conventional banks. Most of the participation loans are collateralized, while the amount 
of collateral on these loans is lower than conventional loans. It is notable that majority 
of participation loans belong to borrowers borrowing from both types of banks. 
Regarding to industries, loans for construction, manufacturing and wholesale trade have 
important share in the loan portfolio of both participation and conventional banks. 
Participation loans taken by large firms have high share in the loan composition 
of participation banks. We should be careful in the interpretation of firm size proxy 
because size is measured by total value of loans granted to a borrower, during the 
sample period. This measure may create a problem if the value of loans issued before 
the sample period are significant or the firm has low debt ratio. It seems that loans are 
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largely taken in the big cities and the shares are quite close for participation and 
conventional banks. Participation banks are of middle sized in terms of TRY total asset 
size. 35% of Islamic loans and 37% of conventional loans are right censored. This is 
important to notice, since right censoring should be treated in the duration analysis. 
When borrowers are analyzed, table 5 indicates that about 9% of borrowers 
failed to fulfill payments by more than 90 days. The default rate is about 6.3% in case 
of 180 days. In terms of borrower composition of banks, only one third of participation 
bank borrowers take loans solely from this type of banks. Majority of their borrowers 
utilizes both types of banks. These borrowers borrowing from both conventional and 
participation banks enable us to test the second hypothesis. The variable, ldegree, 
indicates the highest risk in loan portfolio within a certain bank type for a borrower 
borrowing from conventional and participation bank. If loan degree issued by 
participation bank is higher, it may loosely imply that participation bank sees this 
borrower less risky.  However it might be purely related to riskiness level of loan. The 
average loan degree for the loan portfolio whose borrowers borrow from both types of 
banks is 1.119 for conventional banks and 1.115 for participation banks. The more 
direct link to perception of bank about borrower can be established by bdegree variable. 
Banks give internal ratings to borrowers for their financial situations from one  (least 
risky) to five (riskiest). If the same borrower gets different degrees from different types 
of banks, then this might indicate risk aversion of those types of banks. However it is 
still possible that such difference may be related to time dimension. Among the 
borrowers borrowing from both types of banks, participation bank sees 8.2% of 
borrowers as less risky. Again almost two third of borrowers who borrow from both 
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bank types, first take a loan from conventional bank then from participation bank. 
Reverse happens with around 35% of such borrowers. Finally, 33% of total borrowers 
borrow from more than one bank.  
Table 6 reports the loan-month observations of various characteristics including 
default, borrower, loan, bank, city, and time characteristics. Mean difference of 
participation and conventional observations are statistically significant (Welch t-test) at 
statistical significance level of 0.001. Without control of other characteristics and 
duration dependence, the default rates of participation loans are lower than the default 
rate of conventional loans. The share of loans overdue 90 (180) days is 0.59% (0.43%) 
for participation banks and 0.73% (0.46%) for conventional banks over the time period 
analyzed in this study. The majority of participation bank borrowers (81.6%) also 
borrowed from conventional banks whereas only 22% of conventional bank borrowers 
get loans from participation banks. The share of loans provided to large and medium 
sized firms is high in the participation banks. Loan degree of participation loans are 
slightly favorable on average 10% of loans are issued during Ramadan. 
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Figure.13: Sample NPL Ratios of 
Firm Loans of  Conventional and 
Participation Banks(%)  
Figure.14: Sample Collateral Ratios 
of Firm Loans of Conventional and 
Participation Banks(%) 
  
Figure reports NPL ratios (90 days overdue) of conventional 
and participation loans during the sample period 
Figure reports collateral amount divided by loan amount of 
conventional and participation loans during the sample period 
 
Figure.15: Sample Weighted 
Maturity of Firm Loans of 
Participation and Conventional 
Banks  
 
Figure reports weighted maturity of participation and 
































The sample data show that the average NPL ratio is 1.4% in the sample period. 
Loan amount weighted maturity is around 1.5 year, while collateral amount is above 
loan amount (112%). As presented in Figures 13, 14 and 15, loans issued by 
conventional banks have higher quality (1.3% versus 2%), longer maturity (1.5 year 
versus 1.3 year) and higher collateral ratio (115% versus 80%) than those issued by 
participation banks.  
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CHAPTER 8  
 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
8.1 Main Findings 
The first null hypothesis that participation and conventional loans are equally 
likely to default is rejected as reported in Table 7, when borrower, loan and bank 
characteristics are controlled in the model. Table 7 reports the results of duration 
models with Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function for the whole sample. 
Dependent variable is hazard rate in the models. Although the first model in Table 7, 
which does not take any control variable or fixed effects into account, claims otherwise, 
participation loans are more likely to default than conventional loans when borrower, 
loan and bank characteristics are controlled for. The hypothesis is rejected regardless of 
the inclusion of year-month, financing and city fixed effects. Moreover, when interest 
rate is excluded from the model, the results do not change. This is contrary to the 
findings of Baele et al. (2014).  
The models (5) and (7) reported in Table 7 indicate the comparison of the loans 
of dual borrowers and borrowers who borrow from only participation banks. The loans 
belonging to dual borrowers survive less compared to the loans belonging to borrowers 
who borrow from only participation banks. This finding is consistent with the findings 
of Baele et al. (2014). In addition, the loans of dual borrowers are found to be more 
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likely to default compared to the loans of borrowers who get loans only from 
conventional banks. A possible explanation for this finding is that firms exceeding loan 
limits from conventional loans may try to take additional loan from participation banks. 
However, purely borrowing from participation bank may be related to religious 
motivation. If that is the case, then relatively more religious, so more risk averse 
borrowers as argued by Hess (2012) with the assumption that religiosity-risk averse 
relationship is valid for religious people in Turkey as well, may be the reason for lower 
credit risk compared to dual borrowers. The counter argument is that the borrowers, 
who could not borrow from conventional banks if they are too risky, get loan from 
participation banks. If that was the case, it is expected that the loans of these borrowers 
should have been riskier than loans of dual borrowers. Therefore, there can be religious 
motivation for at least the majority of borrowers who only borrow from participation 
banks based on the risk aversion-religiosity relationship assumption. 
Table 8 further investigates the first null hypothesis for different samples. When 
loans of borrowers who work with only one bank are analyzed in models (7) and (8) in 
Table 8, participation loans survive longer if the loan is only loan outstanding for the 
borrower (model (7)). However, if borrower gets more than one loan, participation 
loans perform worse (model (8)). This may be related to “soft-budget constraint” issue 
described by Boot (2000) that perhaps the bank is trying to protect its close relationship 
with firm, but firms abuse this relationship by taking more risk.  
The second null hypothesis that participation and conventional loans of a dual 
borrower are equally likely to default is rejected. Table 9 presents the results of the 
continuous parametric survival models with Weibull distribution for a sample of 
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borrowers who get loans from both participation and conventional banks. The 
participation loans of dual borrowers are more likely to default than conventional loans 
after controlling for bank characteristics, firm characteristics and city, year-month and 
financing fixed effects. The same finding is observed when interest rate is not 
controlled in the model (5). This finding is also the opposite of what Baele et al. (2014) 
find for the banks in Pakistan.  
The third null hypothesis, which loans are equally likely to default during 
Ramadan and in the cities where piousness is high, is rejected. Table 12 reports the 
results of duration models by using different proxies to capture piousness or network 
effect. The proxies for piousness as well as network effect are Ramadan month 
indicator, a variable defined by using the number of mosques per capita in the city, a 
variable using number of Al-Quran course attendees per capita in the city. The proxy 
for network effect is big city which is defined by a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one if the population of the city is greater than 750,000 inhabitants. Piousness 
and network effect proxies are included one by one in the models. Loans are found to 
be significantly less prone to default during Ramadan period regardless of whether 
interest rate on loans is controlled or nor in the model. Loans are also found to be less 
inclined to default in cities where there are more mosques and number of course 
participants per population, only when the interest rate is not included in the model. The 
other finding is that loans are more prone to default in big cities.  
Ramadan anomaly is also documented by Białkowski et al. (2013). They argue 
the Ramadan has a positive effect on investor confidence. They also indicate that 
Ramadan anomaly holds especially in Turkey and in markets where there are more 
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Muslims. During Ramadan it might be expected that pious borrowers are more likely to 
be loyal to their loan payments. It can be argued that in cities where there are more 
mosques, one can expect that network effect may force pious borrowers to be more 
loyal to their loans. However, the results should be interpreted cautiously because the 
number of mosque divided by population may be related to the prosperity of a city. The 
number of Al-Quran course participants per capita in a city may weakly signal overall 
piousness level. Introducing the interest rate variable seems to capture the effects of 
piousness and network effect proxies as shown in Table 12. The intuitive reasoning for 
this finding is that interest rate may capture some of the proxy characteristics because 
for the cities in which piousness is relatively high, one can expect that interest based 
instruments would not be demanded highly. Hence, decrease in demand may lead to 
decrease in interest rate of loans. Including interest rate variable seems to capture also 
the effect of being a big city as well. This might also be relevant with the demand 
conditions of loans. Interest rate can be high in cities where there is much more demand 
for loans.  
The further investigation of piousness level is shown in Table 13. Table 13 
reports the results of continuous survival models with additional interaction variables 
between a dummy variable for participation loans and religiosity proxies. The models 
(1) to (4) reported in Table 13 present the maximum likelihood estimation results for 
duration analyses with Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function for the whole 
sample. The models (5) to (12) report the results for samples of loans taken by small 
and large firms. Interestingly, participation loans during Ramadan are found to be more 
likely to default for the whole sample. This result also holds for small firms sample; i.e 
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participation loans taken by small firms during Ramadan are more likely to default as 
shown in the model (6). However, for large firms the coefficient is insignificant. 
Although loans taken in big cities are more likely to fail for the whole sample, loans 
taken by large firms in big cities are less likely to default. Two religiosity proxies 
(more_mosque and more_coursier) are found to be negatively associated with hazard 
rate in case of large sample. That is, both conventional and participation loans taken by 
large firms in cities where there are more mosques and more attendees of Al-Quran 
courses per population, are found to be less inclined to default compared to other cities. 
Moreover, the absolute value of these coefficients on interaction terms with 
participation loans for large firms is higher than the coefficients of city characteristics. 
It seems that large firms getting participation loans from more religious cities are less 
likely to default, so they are more loyal to their loans in these cities.  
Dietsch and Joel (2004) find that SMEs are riskier than large firms. Therefore, 
Altman and Sabato (2007) suggest separating large and small firms in terms of their 
credit risk. Models (1) and (2) reported in Table 8 investigate the default rates of loans 
borrowed by small firms. It is important to remind that small and large firms are 
classified by their total amount of loans granted by all banks during the sample period. 
A firm is classified as small firm in terms of their total assets or sales. It is found that 
participation loans of small firms are more likely to default than conventional loans of 
small firms. This finding does not change, if borrower borrows only from participation 
bank or borrows from participation and conventional banks. Models (3) and (4) 
reported in Table 8 investigate whether participation loans are different from 
conventional loans in terms of credit risk for a sample of large firms. The participation 
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loans are found to be riskier than conventional loans for these firms as well. Moreover, 
when I compare the model (1) and (3) in Table 8, participation loans of large firms are 
more likely to default compared to participation loans of small firms. In addition, 
participation loans of large firms are more likely to default with the passage of survival 
time since the duration dependence of such loans are higher in magnitude than duration 
dependence of small firm loans. All of the models reported in Table 8 control for 
borrower, loan and bank characteristics and year-month, financing and city fixed 
effects.  
The second hypothesis is also tested separately for small and large firms. Table 
11 indicates continuous survival analyses results of the models for small and large firms 
which are dual borrowers. As shown in Table 11, the findings for the whole sample are 
valid for small and large dual borrowers. The absolute value of coefficients on 
parsenior and consenior variables are higher for small firms than large firms, suggesting 
that loans of small dual borrower firms taking loans initially from conventional banks 
are more risky compared to loans of large dual borrowers taking loans initially from 
conventional banks.  
Participation banks in Turkey are neither small nor big in terms of asset size. 
Therefore, comparing participation banks with large banks may distort findings. The 
loans granted by large banks are excluded from the sample, and models are estimated 
for the sample of loans given by small and medium sized banks in some of the models. 
The results of the models are reported in columns (5) and (6) in Table 8 as well as 
columns (5), (6), and (7) in Table 10. In a similar size setting, participation loans still 
perform worse than conventional loans in terms of credit risk while controlling for 
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year-month, city and financing fixed effects as reported in columns (5) and (6) in Table 
8. Worse performance of participation loans is observed also for participation loans of 
dual borrowers as reported in columns (5), (6) and (7) in Table 10. 
Some of the findings with respect to control variables are contrary to the 
expectations. For example, the longer maturity is associated with lower default rate. It 
may be related to screening hypothesis that long term loans are monitored more 
carefully (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004). Such screening hypothesis may be valid to 
explain the negative coefficient found on collateral variable. There is no clear cut 
expectation about the sign of this coefficient. Jiménez and Saurina (2004) argue that 
collateral may be positively or negatively associated with probability of default. 
Negative association is possible as long as moral hazard may be alleviated with 
collateral. It might be the case that borrowers avoid to default when they have 
collateral, since they have more to lose in case of default. The interest rate/(financing 
rate for participation banks) is found to have negative coefficient. Higher levels of 
interest rate may be understood as higher risk for customer, so the bankers examine 
those more strictly, resulting in lower default rate.  
When borrower characteristics are examined, the size of borrower is found to be 
negatively associated with default rate in general. Banks may screen large firms 
vigilantly which is consistent with screening hypothesis (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004). 
Loans of borrowers working with more than one bank –multiplebank variable-, holding 
all else constant, are more likely to default as shown in Table 7. It may be the case that 
riskiness of borrower forces him to take additional loans from other banks because of 
reaching the borrowing limit from a single bank. However, the size effect is observed 
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for small firms as shown in the columns (1) and (2) in Table 8. It seems that loans of 
large firms are less likely to default if the large firm works with multiple banks. The 
intuition behind this is that banks monitor carefully large firms to protect their claims, 
since now they have competitors and more to lose in case of default (Jimenez and 
Saurina, 2004).  
The bank control variables also provide interesting results. As expected, loans 
granted by the state banks are more likely to default when year-month, financing and 
city fixed effects are controlled and interest rate is excluded as in the model (7) reported 
in Table 7. Similarly, loans of investment banks are found to be riskier than loans of 
deposit banks while controlling for fixed effects as again shown in the model (7) 
reported in Table 7. It is notable that investment banks seem to be good at picking small 
firms as shown in Table 8. The “soft-budget constraint” issue stated by Boot (2000) can 
explain higher credit risk of large firms and firms that get multiple loans from a single 
bank (Models (3) and (8) reported in Table 8). Boot (2000) argues that banks may be 
loose in imposing requirement of debt contracts because of their close relationship with 
these firms. These firms seem to exploit firm-bank relationship. 
Loans taken from large banks are more likely to default as shown in Table 8. 
This finding that large banks are riskier is consistent with the findings of Čihák and 
Hesse (2010). It can be explained by the too-big-to-fail hypothesis. 
Although loans of small firms taken by foreign banks perform worse, it seems 
that foreign banks are good in picking large firms (Models (1) and (3) in Table 8). 
Şahin and Doğukanli(2014) argue that foreign banks provide loans to less risky and 
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more transparent firms. It seems that foreign banks prefer quality borrowers, so they are 
able to manage credit risk even in multiple lendings. 
Two explanations can be proposed to explain why the findings for Turkish 
banks differ from the findings of Baele et al. (2014) for the first and second hypotheses 
ie, having higher default rates for loans given by participation banks.  
First of all, the aggressive growth strategies of participation banks in Turkey 
and government support for the target of 15% market share for participation banks in 
2023 may partly explain the comparatively higher credit risk of participation banks. It 
might be related to moral hazard hypothesis (Saeed and Izzeldin, 2014) that managers 
of participation banks may feel to be forced to increase their loan size while sacrificing 
the performance of loans. The target of high market share (15% in 2023) might pressure 
managers of participation banks to extend excessive credits. Moreover, as shown in 
Table 2, operational expense to average total assets of participation banks is at 
downward trend. This may imply two options: either operational efficiency increases or 
risk management practices are reduced (moral hazard).  
Second, bad luck hypothesis stated by Saeed and Izzeldin (2014) might be valid. 
This hypothesis claims that since participation banks can not charge penalties for 
overdue loans, the risky borrowers has an incentive to prefer Islamic banks. This is 
what I see empirically in table 10 with consenior variable. It seems that the loans of 
borrowers who borrow first from conventional bank then from participation bank are 
more inclined to default. The magnitude of this coefficient is even higher in case of 
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small firms. That is, loans of small firms switching to participation banks seem to be 
riskier than loans of large firms switching to participation banks. 
8.2 Robustness Checks 
Several robustness checks are employed to examine whether the findings are 
robust. First, right censored observations are excluded from the sample. Although this 
procedure eliminates right censoring problem, it is not recommended because these 
observations carry important information so excluding them creates a sample selection 
bias. The excluded observations are more likely to have higher maturity and/or granted 
close to the end of sample period. Table 14 reports the results of the maximum 
likelihood estimation of continuous duration models with Weibull distribution for the 
sample of loans excluding right censored observations in models. Columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 14 reject the first null hypothesis similar to previous finding that participation 
loans are more likely to default compared to conventional loans. Models reported in 
columns (3), (4) and (5) in Table 14 test the second null hypothesis. Participation loans 
of dual borrowers survive less compared to conventional loans of dual borrowers. In 
models reported in columns (6), (7), (8) and (9) in Table 14, the coefficients of 
piousness and network effect proxies are similar to the coefficients for the whole 
sample. Among the control variables, the coefficient of maturity has changed. When the 
right censored observations are excluded, higher maturity loans are found to be more 
likely to default. The difference can be explained by the exclusion of loans with higher 
maturity from the sample. The coefficients of state bank and foreign bank are also 
found to be sensitive to the exclusion of right censored observations from the sample.  
63 
As a second robustness check, the definition of default is changed. The banking 
regulation classifies a loan as default when loan payment is being 90 days or more 
overdue. Table 15 reports results of the the maximum likelihood estimation of duration 
models with Weibull distribution with new default definition; that is, 180 or more days 
overdue of loan payment. Results are consistent with the findings of previous 
comparable models. The only difference is observed for the borrowers getting a single 
loan form a single bank. It is found that the default rate of participation loans of those 
borrowers is not found to be significantly different from the default rate of conventional 
loans, as reported in column (5) in Table 15. 
One of the assumptions made in grouping the loan information is that there are 
no duplicate observations for a single loan in the data set. Therefore, a loan is assumed 
to be unique if it is issued by a bank from a branch with the same financing code, the 
same original maturity and same starting date. However there might be duplicate 
observations with above mentioned characteristics. These observations either represent 
another loan or they are “duplicate” because of misreporting. Therefore as a robustness 
check, the so called “duplicate” observations are excluded from the model. Table 16 
reports the results of the maximum likelihood estimations of the duration models, 
excluding duplicate observations from the sample. The participation loans are more 
likely to default compared to conventional loans for all borrowers and also for dual 
borrowers. During Ramadan, loans are less likely to default. Loans in cities where there 
are more number of mosques per capita are also less prone to default. However, the 
negative association between more attendees of Al-Quran courses per population in a 
city -more_coursier variable- with default rate disappears in this sample. Loans of dual 
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borrowers, who first borrow from conventional banks then from participation banks, are 
positively associated with hazard rate. The major findings are similar to previous ones. 
Fourth, a discrete survival time analysis is employed. Treating the survival time 
as continuous or discrete requires the robustness check. The reason is that loans default 
on a certain date, but the default of loans are grouped in time intervals such as months. 
Moreover, Weibull regression restricts the baseline hazard to be linear. Therefore, no 
baseline hazard assumption should be tested. Complementary log-log regression can be 
used in discrete analysis. 
The discrete model for the analysis can be shown as follows for complementary 
log log regression (Jenkins, 2005) 
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑔[ℎ(𝑗, 𝑋)] = 𝐷(𝑗) + 𝛽′𝑋            (2) 
Where , j= Discrete time specification and 𝐷(𝑗) = Baseline hazard function  
Dependent variable is default of a loan in a certain month in case of discrete 
model. D(j) stands for duration dependence (baseline hazard). In baseline discrete 
model there is no functional form assumption for duration dependence. Natural 
logarithm of survival time is assumed to compare results with results of continuous 
Weibull model. Table 17 reports the test results of three hypotheses with discrete model 
setting. Three null hypotheses are rejected. The previous results are supported with the 
discrete time models while controlling for loan, borrower and bank characteristics, as 





CHAPTER 9  
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I compare the default rates of loans issued by participation and 
conventional banks during the period January 2011 - December 2012 in Turkey. Banks 
provided more than 4 million loans to firms during this period. Three hypotheses are 
tested. The first hypothesis is that participation loans are equally likely to default 
compared to conventional loans controlling for loan, bank and borrower characteristic 
and fixed effects. The second hypothesis tests default rates for the dual borrowers. The 
third hypothesis is related with the default rates and proxies used for piousness.  
I find that participation loans are more likely to default than conventional loans, 
controlling for borrower, loan and bank characteristics. Loans of firms working with 
only participation banks are found to be less prone to default compared to loans of 
firms working with both participation and conventional banks. When the firms that 
borrow from both types of banks are examined, participation loans are more likely to 
default. Loans are less inclined to default during Ramadan. Large firm loans are found 
to survive longer in cities where the population is high, where there are proportionately 
more mosques and more Al-Quran course participants per population. The findings are 
found to be robust to the identification of loans, continuous or discrete survival time 
specification of the model, and default specification. 
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There are some limitations for these analyses that should be kept in mind. In 
order to identify a loan, it is assumed that a single loan is unique if it is issued by a bank 
from a branch with the same financing code, the same original maturity and same 
starting date. This assumption may affect the results, since misreported –duplicate- 
observations may be counted as a different loan. In order to overcome this problem, I 
exclude these duplicate observations. Moreover, the size of data requires a trade-off 
between sample size and sample period. I used two years of data. Although it is not a 
long period, there are more than 18.5 million loan month observations. Another 
limitation is the use of loan amount in clarifying large and small firms. Total loan 
amount granted only during the sample period may not adequately represent the true 
firm size. The reason is that there may be loans given before or after the sample period. 
Finally, the piousness proxies are questionable.  The true piousness level is hard to 
measure.  The proxies in this thesis may capture some other effects and it is hard to 
separate those effects. For example number of mosques per population in a city may 
capture the wealth effect of city. Piousness of firm may not necessarily be linked to 
overall piousness of the city .A survey conducted for the firm may be more direct 
indicator for piousness. 
There are several policy implications of our empirical findings. First, the 
balanced growth of the participation banks may be supported rather than aggressive 
growth strategies. They may be extending to riskier borrowers because of high market 
share targets. Second, SME financing is important in the economies since SMEs 
contributes to job creation as well as economic growth. It seems that participation banks 
may increase financing to SMEs with a high share in their loan portfolio. However, the 
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SME function of the participation banks can be further enhanced with a prudential 
manner. PLS mechanism can support this function. The other finding that most of the 
borrowers of participation banks also borrow from conventional banks implies that 
participation banks fail somehow to attract conservative -so risk averse- customers. 
Enhancing the trust for the products of participation banks and increasing the 
standardization of legal framework for such products may be considered to attract 
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APPENDIX A: BANKS IN TURKEY 
 
Table 1. First Glance of Turkish Banking System 
 Banking Sector Participation Banks 












113.3* 4.3 5.0 6.1 6.0* 
Loans/Total 
Assets 























29.9 16.4 31.8 18.5 25.0 24.5 29.3 3.3 
Deposits/To
tal assets 








2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.6 5.0 
Provisionin
g ratio 
79.4 75.2 76.3 73.9 65.4 75.1 63.2 62.4 
Source: CBRT 
Table reports some characteristics of deposit and participation banks for the period of  2011-2014. * 
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Assets (%)  
 Net Income / Average 
Shareholder's Equity (%) 
Net Interest (Profit) 
Revenues (Expenses) / 
Average Total Assets 
(%) 
 Fees, Commission and Banking 
Services Revenues / Average 
Total Assets (%) 
 Operational Expenses / 






























































2006 12 2.60 2.49 3.31 21.01 22.24 30.76 4.85 4.76 5.54 1.90 3.07 4.14 3.08 1.91 3.31 
2007 12 2.78 2.69 3.14 24.77 26.63 30.72 4.88 4.80 5.41 1.94 3.01 4.04 3.01 1.93 3.47 
2008 12 2.05 1.94 2.84 18.74 19.86 24.12 4.72 4.61 5.41 1.91 3.04 4.13 3.04 1.90 3.46 
2009 12 2.63 2.59 2.35 22.92 25.24 18.99 5.44 5.43 5.17 1.80 2.72 3.79 2.73 1.80 2.88 
2010 12 2.46 2.46 2.02 20.12 22.17 16.86 4.30 4.30 4.01 1.60 2.62 3.45 2.63 1.60 2.31 
2011 12 1.74 1.73 1.62 15.48 16.76 14.84 3.46 3.43 3.68 1.50 2.30 3.03 2.31 1.50 2.06 
2012 12 1.83 1.84 1.47 15.68 16.81 14.69 4.07 4.08 3.98 1.50 2.35 2.98 2.35 1.52 1.99 
2013 12 1.60 1.61 1.26 14.19 15.11 13.75 3.72 3.74 3.45 1.46 2.30 2.69 2.28 1.49 1.65 
2014 12 1.33 1.36 0.15 12.25 13.29 1.58 3.53 3.55 3.21 1.39 2.11 2.71 2.11 1.43 1.49 
Source: BRSA Statistics 












    Table 3. Sample Characteristics 
Variable Unit Number of Observations 
Original loan month observations  Loan-Month 47,741,789 
Exclusion of loans given to government, 
banking and international institutions 
and/or opened before sample period and/or 
missing variables  
Loan-Month 29,228,095 
Total sample loan-month observations  Loan-Month 18,513,694 
Participation Banking observations Loan-Month 2,089,786 





  Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Loan Observations 
  Unit Conventional Participation Sector 
def_loan =1 if loan defaults(90 days 
overdue), =0 otherwise 
% 0.0286 0.0311 0.0288 
def_loan2 =1 if loan defaults (180 day 
overdue), =0 otherwise 
% 0.0184 0.0226 0.0187 
diff =1 if there are many loans 
for a borrower; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.9777 0.9914 0.9789 
collateral =1 if the loan is 
collateralized; =0 otherwise 
% 0.7902 0.9303 0.8024 
loan_ 
amount 
the loan amount at opening 1,000 
TRY 
152.3951 123.2842 149.8632 
sum 
collateral 
the collateral amount of 
loan at opening  
1,000 
TRY 
144.4398 92.3582 139.9101 
intrate interest rate of loan % 14.2514 12.5253 14.0966 
loandegree Regulation based loan 
degree, 1=highest - 
5=lowest degree  
Unit 1.0799 1.0558 1.0778 
maturity time to original maturity in 
terms of month 
Months 11.1452 9.5969 11.0106 
borr_ 
conventional 
=1 if a borrower borrows 
from conventional bank 
only; =0 otherwise 
% 0.7701 - 0.7031 
borr_ 
participation 
=1 if a borrower borrows 
from participation bank 
only; =0 otherwise 
% - 0.1923 0.0167 
twotype =1 if a borrower borrows 
from two type of banks; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.2299 0.8077 0.2802 
agriculture =1 if loan is for agriculture; 
=0 otherwise 
% 0.0292 0.0280 0.0291 
construction =1 if loan is for 
construction; =0 otherwise 
% 0.1044 0.1579 0.1091 
manufacturing =1 if loan is for 
manufacturing; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.3425 0.3272 0.3412 
mining =1 if loan is for mining; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.0108 0.0130 0.0110 
education =1 if loan is for education; 
=0 otherwise 
% 0.0043 0.0100 0.0048 
electricity =1 if loan is for electricity; 
=0 otherwise 
% 0.0039 0.0076 0.0043 
wholesale 
trade 
=1 if loan is for 
wholesaletrade; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.3169 0.2587 0.3118 
transporting =1 if loan is for 
transporting; =0 otherwise 
% 0.0540 0.0277 0.0517 
fishing =1 if loan is for fishing; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.0013 0.0015 0.0013 
health =1 if loan is for health; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.0120 0.0161 0.0123 
hotel =1 if loan is for hotel; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.0189 0.0080 0.0180 





  Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Loan Observations 
  Unit Conventional Participation Sector 
=0 otherwise 
renting =1 if loan is for renting; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.0283 0.0188 0.0275 
large_firm =1 if sum of loans by 
borrower is > 75th 
percentile, =0 otherwise 
% 0.2507 0.4332 0.2665 
small_firm =1 if sum of loans by 
borrower is < 25th 
percentile, =0 otherwise 
% 0.2511 0.1424 0.2416 
part_loan =1 if participation bank; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.0000 1.0000 0.0870 
privatebank =1 if bank is private 
domestic; =0 otherwise 
% 0.5738 - 0.5239 
investment 
bank 
=1 if bank is investment or 
development bank; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.0014 - 0.0012 
foreignbank =1 if bank is foreign bank; 
=0 otherwise 
% 0.2150 - 0.1963 
largebank =1 if TRY total assets of 
bank is > 75th percentile; 
=0 otherwise 
% 0.8783 - 0.8019 
smallbank =1 if TRY total assets of 
bank is < 25th percentile; 
=0 otherwise 
% 0.0011 - 0.0010 
bigcity =1 if pop>750000; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.8734 0.8711 0.8732 
Right 
censoring 
=1 if maturity of  loan is 
greater than sample end-
period;  =0 otherwise 
% 0.3743 0.3547 0.3726 
Number of Loans Number 4,080,559 388,711 4,469,270 
 
Table reports the descriptive statistics of loan observations. Shares of variable with respect to sub-total 
and total loans are shown. The reported loan characteristics represent the characteristics at the time of 








Table 5.  Variables Indicating Borrower Characteristics  
   Conventional Participation Sector 
  Unit Share/Number Share/Number Share/Number 
def_borr =1 if borrower 
defaults,=0 
otherwise 
% 0.0862 0.0521 0.0862 
 Number 28,027 1,643 28,898 
def_borr2 =1 if borrower 
defaults (180 days 
overdue),=0 
otherwise 
% 0.0601 0.0416 0.0600 
 Number 19,692 1,310 20,430 





% - 0.3201 - 
 Number - 10,088 - 





% 0.9341 - - 
 Number 303,578 - - 
twotype =1 if a borrower 
borrows from two 
type of banks; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.0659 0.6799 0.0639 
 Number 21,422 21,422 21,422 
ldegree   =1 if participation 




% of two 
type 
borrowers 
- 0.1565 - 
 Number - 3.352 - 
bdegree =1 if participation 




% of two 
type 
borrowers 
- 0.0820 - 
 Number - 1,756 - 
diff =1 if there are 
many loans for a 
borrower; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.6968 0.4561 0.7187 
 Number 226,451 14,371 240,822 
consenior =1 if conventional 
loan has early 
initiation; =0 
otherwise 
% of two 
type 
borrowers 
0.0417 0.6337 - 
 Number 13,576 13,576 - 
parsenior =1 if participation 
loan has early 
initiation; =0 
otherwise 
% of two 
type 
borrowers 
0.0234 0.3554 - 
 Number 7,614 7,614 - 
multiplebank =1 if borrower 
borrows from 
multiple number 
of banks; =0 
otherwise 
% 0.3145 0,2798 0.3313 
 Number 102,215 8814 111,029 
Number of Borrowers  325,000 31,510 335,088 
Table reports the descriptive statistics of loan observations. Shares indicate either number of borrowers for the 
variable divided by number of total borrowers or divided by number of two type bank borrowers . Reported borrower 







Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics of Loan-Month Observations 
 
  Conventional Participation Sector 
  Number 
 
Share Number Share Number Share 
Loan Performance:       
tga =1 if loan defaults 
certain month; =0 
otherwise 
116,759 0.0073 12,100 0.0059 128,859 0.0071 
tga2 =1 if loan defaults 
(180 day overdue) 
certain month; =0 
otherwise 
74,945 0.0046 8,784 0.0043 83,729 0.0046 
Borrower Characteristics:       
twotype =1 if a borrower 
borrows from two 
types of banks; =0 
otherwise 
3,614,117 0.2201 1,704,918 0.8158 5,319,035 0.2873 
borr_participati
on 





- - 384,868 0.1842 384,868 0.0208 





12,809,791 0.7799 - - 12,809,791 0.6919 
large_firm =1 if sum of loans 
by borrower is > 
75th percentile, 
=0 otherwise 
3,664,306 0.2231 963,533 0.4611 4,627,839 0.2500 
small_firm =1 if sum of loans 
by borrower is < 
25th percentile, 
=0 otherwise 
4,373,602 0.2663 233,969 0.1120 4,607,571 0.2489 
consenior =1 if conventional 
loan has early 
initiation; =0 
otherwise 
2,820,657 0.7971 774,567 0.4691 3,595,224 0.6927 
parsenior =1 if participation 
loan has early 
initiation; =0 
otherwise 
718,169 0.2029 876,677 0.5309 1,594,846 0.3073 
diff  =1 if there are 
many loans for a 
borrower; =0 
otherwise 
15,835,081 0.9641 2,061,382 0.9864 17,896,463 0.9667 
size sum of all loans 
taken by borrower 







lnsize the natural log of 
the sum of all 
loans taken by 
borrower from all 
banks 
- 6.0677 - 7.1525 - 6.1901 
ldegree =1 if participation 




908,728 0.2514 324,734 0.1905 1,233,462 0.2319 
bdegree =1 if participation 









Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics of Loan-Month Observations 
 
  Conventional Participation Sector 
multiplebank =1 if borrower 
borrows from 
multiple number 
of banks; =0 
otherwise 
12,334,176 0.7510 1,862,085 0.8910 14,196,261 0.7668 
Loan Characteristics:        
collateral =1 if the loan is 
collateralized; =0 
otherwise 
14,007,283 0.8529 1,990,317 0.9524 15,997,600 0.8641 
sumcollateral the collateral 
amount of loan 
- 158.3252 - 96.2061 - 151.3133 
lnsumcollateral the natural log of 
collateral amount 
of loan 
- 2.1476 - 3.0622 - 2.2508 
col_size the highest 
collateral amount 
of loan 
- 215.9481 - 127.5723 - 205.9724 




- 2.8342 - 3.5990 - 2.9205 
ymloandegree Monthly 
regulatory degree 
of loan, =1 
Highest, =5 
Lowest 
- 1.1198 - 1.1081 - 1.1185 
intrate interest rate of 
loan 
- 13.4014 - 14.4490 - 14.0900 
loan_amount the loan amount - 136.8164 - 119.6588 - 134.8797 
lnloan_amount the natural log of 
the loan amount 
- 3.5696 - 3.7356 - 3.5884 
loansize the highest loan 
amount 
- 161.4622 - 154.0145 - 160.6216 
maturity time to original 
maturity in terms 
of month 
- 16.5386 - 12.8828 - 16.1259 
longmaturity =1 if maturity of 




4,365,038 0.2658 228,450 0.1093 4,593,488 0.2481 
shortmaturity =1 if maturity of 
loan is less than 
25th percentile; 
=0 otherwise 
4,096,611 0.2494 456,579 0.2185 4,553,190 0.2459 
rightcensoring =1 if maturity of  
loan is greater 
than sample end-
period;  =0 
otherwise 
7,858,636 0.4785 822,101 0.3934 8,680,737 0.4689 
agriculture =1 if loan is for 
agriculture; =0 
otherwise 
528,826 0.0322 58,486 0.0280 587,312 0.0317 
construction =1 if loan is for 
construction; =0 
otherwise 
1,745,784 0.1063 377,439 0.1806 2,123,223 0.1147 
manufacturing =1 if loan is for 
manufacturing; 
=0 otherwise 
5,535,531 0.3370 780,370 0.3734 6,315,901 0.3411 
mining =1 if loan is for 
mining; =0 
otherwise 
168,215 0.0102 28,316 0.0135 196,531 0.0106 
education =1 if loan is for 
education; =0 
otherwise 







Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics of Loan-Month Observations 
 
  Conventional Participation Sector 
electricity =1 if loan is for 
electricity; =0 
otherwise 
57,839 0.0035 16,536 0.0079 74,375 0.0040 
wholesaletrade =1 if loan is for 
wholesaletrade; 
=0 otherwise 
5,620,764 0.3422 572,268 0.2738 6,193,032 0.3345 
transporting =1 if loan is for 
transporting; =0 
otherwise 
1,166,982 0.0711 68,907 0.0330 1,235,889 0.0668 
fishing =1 if loan is for 
fishing; =0 
otherwise 
24,766 0.0015 3,255 0.0016 28,021 0.0015 
health =1 if loan is for 
health; =0 
otherwise 
213,581 0.0130 39,100 0.0187 252,681 0.0136 
hotel =1 if loan is for 
hotel; =0 
otherwise 
354,062 0.0216 19,313 0.0092 373,375 0.0202 
individual =1 if loan is for 
individual; =0 
otherwise 
402,536 0.0245 59,848 0.0286 462,384 0.0250 
renting =1 if loan is for 
renting; =0 
otherwise 
515,568 0.0314 44,960 0.0215 560,528 0.0303 
Bank Characteristics:       
largebank =1 if TRY total 
assets of bank is > 
75th percentile; 
=0 otherwise 
15,092,845 0.9190 - - 15,092,845 0.8152 
smallbank =1 if TRY total 
assets of bank is > 
75th percentile; 
=0 otherwise 
9,336 0.0006 - - 9,336 0.0005 
privatebank =1 if bank is 
private domestic; 
=0 otherwise 
9,007,367 0.5484 - - 9,007,367 0.4865 
statebank =1 if bank is state  
bank; =0 
otherwise 
4,472,932 0.2723 - - 4,472,932 0.2416 
foreignbank =1 if bank is 
foreign bank; =0 
otherwise 
2,922,617 0.1779 - - 2,922,617 0.1579 





20,933 0.0013 - - 20,933 0.0011 
City Characteristics:       
bigcity =1 if 
pop>750000; =0 
otherwise 
14,058,871 0.8560 1,852,586 0.8865 15,911,457 0.8594 
more_mosque =1 if # of 
mosques divided 
by population > 
75th percentile; 
=0 otherwise 
633,819 0.0386 63,577 0.0304 697,396 0.0377 
few_mosque =1 if # of 
mosques divided 
by population < 
25th percentile; 
=0 otherwise 







Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics of Loan-Month Observations 
 
  Conventional Participation Sector 
few_coursier =1 if # of Al-
Quran course 
participants/popul
ation < 25th 
percentile; =0 
otherwise 
9,898,021 0.6027 1,328,242 0.6356 11,226,263 0.6064 
more_coursier =1 if # of Al-
Quran course 
participants/popul
ation > 75th 
percentile; =0 
otherwise 
1,176,281 0.0716 115,847 0.0554 1,292,128 0.0698 
Time Period:       
ramadan =1 if Ramadan is 
at that month; =0 
otherwise 
1,514,119 0.0922 193,487 0.0926 1,707,606 0.0922 
Number of Year-month 
Observations 
16,423,908 - 2,089,786 - 18,513,694 - 
Table reports the descriptive statistics of loan-month observations. Shares of variable with respect to sub-total and total loan-









Table 7. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of 
Hypothesis 1 













































part_loan -0.196*** 2.891*** 2.899*** 2.209***  1.594***  
 (0.042) (0.075) (0.075) (0.080)  (0.079)  
borr_ 
participation 
    0.484***  0.408*** 
     (0.070)  (0.069) 
twotype     0.809***  0.969*** 
     (0.036)  (0.039) 
Loan Characteristics:       
maturity  -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.040*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
collateral  -2.085*** -2.084*** -2.168*** -2.182*** -2.598*** -2.560*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.022) (0.022) 
intrate  -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.127*** -0.117***   
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)   
Borrower Characteristics:       
lnsize  -0.265*** -0.263*** -0.286*** -0.347*** -0.428*** -0.483*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
diff  0.149*** 0.147*** 0.101*** 0.158*** -0.023 0.059** 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) 
multiplebank  0.178*** 0.180*** 0.380*** 0.264*** 0.503*** 0.343*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) 
Bank Characteristics:       
statebank  -0.088*** -0.075** 0.264*** 0.240*** 0.173*** 0.154*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) 
investment 
bank 
 1.864*** 1.918*** 1.353*** 0.157 1.197*** 0.361 
  (0.276) (0.281) (0.295) (0.291) (0.352) (0.334) 
foreignbank  -0.208*** -0.200*** 0.017 -0.011 0.149*** 0.117*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
largebank  2.388*** 2.385*** 1.676*** 0.486*** 1.180*** 0.418*** 
  (0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.040) (0.070) (0.041) 
_cons -5.063*** -4.869*** -4.894*** -8.038*** -6.727*** -7.637*** -6.928*** 
 (0.016) (0.085) (0.113) (0.255) (0.248) (0.242) (0.236) 
Year-Month 
Fixed Effect  
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financing 
Fixed Effects 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed 
Effects 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 7. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of 
Hypothesis 1 















































18,290,806 18,133,124 18,133,124 18,133,124 18,133,124 18,290,806 18,290,806 
Number of 
Loans 
4,469,270 4,333,401 4,333,401 4,333,401 4,333,401 4,469,270 4,469,270 
Number of 
borrowers 
335,088 333,278 333,278 333,278 333,278 335,088 335,088 
Duration 
Dependence 
1.06 1.26 1.26 1.19 1.19 1.21 1.21 
log-
likelihood 
-647,991 -401,792 -400,392 -346,202 -347,386 -406,561 -402,739 
Number of 
regressors 
3 26 107 131 132 130 131 
chi-squared 21.4*** 60,671*** 63,470*** 125,264*** 112,029*** 95,346*** 87,378*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution. Dependent variable is 
hazard rate in  all models. Model (1) does not include control variables. Through model (2) and (4) fixed effects are included. 
Model (6) and (7) exclude interest rate . Sample period is between 1:2011 to 12:2012. A For each variable in the specification 
Table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). In all estimations 
involving parametric models, standard errors are clustered by borrower. 










Table 8. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of 
Hypothesis 1 - Different Samples 































































part_loan 1.200***  1.639***  2.028***  -0.249* 1.406*** 
 (0.077)  (0.051)  (0.072)  (0.138) (0.149) 
borr_ 
participation 
0.416***  0.587***  1.216***   
  (0.071)  (0.119)  (0.152)   
twotype  0.525***  1.133***  2.008***   
  (0.051)  (0.025)  (0.124)   
Loan Characteristics:        
maturity -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.041*** -0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
collateral -2.144*** -2.138*** -2.988*** -2.965*** -2.854*** -2.783*** -1.817*** -2.348*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.061) (0.058) (0.030) (0.030) 
Borrower Characteristics:       
lnsize -0.577*** -0.581*** -0.228*** -0.255*** -0.267*** -0.294*** -0.588*** -0.697*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.011) 
diff 0.281*** 0.283*** -0.509 -0.540 0.566*** 0.587***   
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.512) (0.512) (0.099) (0.099)   
Multiple 
bank 
0.344*** 0.280*** 0.163 -0.482*** 0.174** -0.632***   
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.106) (0.110) (0.085) (0.164)   
Bank Characteristics:        
statebank 0.101*** 0.094*** 0.077** 0.047   0.394*** 0.139*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.038) (0.037)   (0.038) (0.036) 
investment
bank 
-0.616 -1.214 1.550*** 0.562*** 1.376*** 0.476* 0.375 1.668* 
 (0.921) (0.912) (0.178) (0.173) (0.323) (0.244) (0.474) (0.851) 
Foreign 
bank 
0.214*** 0.207*** -0.228*** -0.340*** 0.734** 0.178 0.252*** -0.117*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.299) (0.143) (0.033) (0.034) 
largebank 1.280*** 0.642*** 1.227*** 0.277***   0.315** 1.383*** 
 (0.067) (0.050) (0.047) (0.023)   (0.128) (0.132) 
_cons -7.308*** -6.726*** -23.402 -23.995 -8.963*** -8.452*** -2.750*** -5.964*** 









Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 8. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of 
Hypothesis 1 - Different Samples 


































































3,869,472 3,869,472 3,901,955 3,901,955 3,393,689 3,393,689 597,732 3,626,234 
Number of 
Loans 
1,222,650 1,222,650 1,268,023 1,268,023 885,313 885,313 94,266 854,514 
Number of 
borrowers 
298,036 298,036   54,909 54,909 94,266 129,793 
Duration 
Dependence 
1.2 1.2 1.64 1.65 1.34 1.38 1.04 1.13 
log-
likelihood 
-160,056 -160,029 -44,729 -44,192 -47,164 -47,716 -22,059 -111,795 
Number of 
regressors 
130 131 130 131 128 129 128 128 
chi-squared 80,235*** 78,276*** 39,441*** 40,514*** 20,734*** 18,691*** 34,118*** 45,831*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution. Dependent variable is 
hazard rate in  all models. Model (1) and (2) have small firm sample. Model (3) and (4) have large firm sample. Model (5) and (6) 
are for medium sized and small sized banks. Model (7-8) include loans whose borrowers have one loan outstanding from a single 
bank. Sample period is between 1:2011 to 12:2012. A For each variable in the specification Table reports the estimated coefficient, 
statistical significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). Except for model 3 and 4, in all estimations involving 
parametric models, standard errors are clustered by borrower. 










Table 9. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of 
Hypothesis 2   


























Diff and Multiple 
Bank 
Sample   Dual Borrower Dual Borrower Dual Borrower Dual Borrower Dual Borrower 
part_loan -0.169*** 2.484*** 2.484*** 1.207*** 0.988*** 
 (0.052) (0.117) (0.116) (0.043) (0.033) 
Loan Characteristics:     
maturity  -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.047*** -0.040*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
collateral  -2.324*** -2.319*** -2.206*** -2.776*** 
  (0.089) (0.089) (0.019) (0.013) 
intrate  -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.076***  
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.001)  
lnloan_amount    -0.288***  
    (0.005)  
Borrower Characteristics:     
lnsize  -0.213*** -0.214*** -0.080*** -0.310*** 
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) 
Bank Characteristics:     
statebank  -0.216*** -0.168** 0.562*** 0.112*** 
  (0.081) (0.079) (0.026) (0.023) 
investmentbank  1.390*** 1.561*** 0.815*** 0.752*** 
  (0.285) (0.284) (0.292) (0.245) 
foreignbank  -0.481*** -0.469*** -0.172*** -0.092*** 
  (0.071) (0.072) (0.021) (0.015) 
largebank  2.278*** 2.285*** 0.943*** 1.094*** 
  (0.095) (0.096) (0.041) (0.032) 
_cons -5.423*** -4.964*** -4.739*** -23.731 -9.492*** 
 (0.049) (0.203) (0.285) (1064.393) (1.002) 
Year-Month Fixed 
Effect  
No No No Yes Yes 
Financing Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Number of loan-
months 
5,261,621 5,221,647 5,221,647 4,004,375 5,261,621 
Number of Loans 1,252,197 1,217,765 1,217,765 820,389 1,252,197 
Number of 
borrowers 
21,422 21,422 21,422   
Duration 
Dependence 
1.21 1.45 1.45 1.75 1.31 
log-likelihood -162,145 -113,957 -112,270 -47,459 -102,936 
Number of 
regressors 
3 24 105 129 128 
chi-squared 10.6*** 9,206*** 36,327*** 82,092*** 118,615*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution. Dependent variable is 
hazard rate in all models.  Sample period is between 1:2011 to 12:2012. A For each variable in the specification Table reports the 
estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). Model (1) does not include control 
variables. Model (2) (3) include interest rate variable and additional fixed effects (year-month, financing, city). Model (4) includes 
interest rate, fixed effects and natural logarithm of loan amount. Model (5) is same as model (4) except excludes natural logarithm 
of loan amount. In estimations of Model (1) (2) (3), standard errors are clustered by borrower. 







Table 10. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of 
Hypothesis 2-Different Bank Size   












































































part_loan     1.758***   
     (0.046)   
parsenior -0.209***  -0.299***   -0.231***  
 (0.014)  (0.014)   (0.022)  
consenior  0.209***  0.299***   0.231*** 
  (0.014)  (0.014)   (0.022) 
Loan Characteristics:       
maturity -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.065*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
collateral -2.508*** -2.508*** -2.774*** -2.774*** -2.888*** -2.766*** -2.766*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
intrate -0.072*** -0.072***      
 (0.001) (0.001)      
Borrower Characteristics:       
lnsize -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.318*** -0.318*** -0.244*** -0.271*** -0.271*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Bank Characteristics:       
statebank 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.097*** 0.097***    
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)    
investmentbank -0.444* -0.444* -0.207 -0.207 1.313*** -0.276 -0.276 
 (0.259) (0.259) (0.259) (0.259) (0.247) (0.259) (0.259) 
foreignbank -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.127*** -0.127*** 1.550*** 0.119** 0.119** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.062) (0.047) (0.047) 
largebank 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.240*** 0.240***    
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)    
_cons -8.148*** -8.357*** -8.576*** -8.875*** -23.868 -21.382 -21.613 
 (1.002) (1.002) (1.002) (1.002) (2159.149) (1379.987) (1379.988) 
Year-Month 
Fixed Effect  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financing 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
loan-months 
5,094,395 5,094,395 5,133,712 5,133,712 2,198,503 2,132,552 2,132,552 
Number of 
Loans 
1,189,343 1,189,343 1,223,177 1,223,177 491,717 478,187 478,187 
Number of 
borrowers 
       
Duration 
Dependence 
1.31 1.31 1.33 1.33 1.35 1.43 1.43 
log-
likelihood 
-92,308 -92,308 -101,197 -101,197 -33,289 -33,545 -33,545 
Number of 
regressors 
129 129 128 128 127 127 127 
chi-squared 120,508*** 120,508*** 115,969*** 115,969*** 37,341*** 34,628*** 34,628*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution. Dependent variable is 
hazard rate in  all models.  Sample period is between 1:2011 to 12:2012. All models include year-month, city, financing fixed 
effects. Model (1) (2) include interest rate variable, while model (3) (4) exclude this variable. Sample is restricted to loans whose 
borrowers borrow from conventional and participation bank in all models. In models (5) (6) (7) additional restriction to sample is to 
exclude large banks. For each variable in the specification Table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and 






Table 11. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of 
Hypothesis 2-Different Firm Size   







































part_loan 1.084***   1.055***   
 (0.161)   (0.056)   
parsenior  -0.527***   -0.381***  
  (0.041)   (0.029)  
consenior   0.527***   0.381*** 
   (0.041)   (0.029) 
Loan Characteristics:      
maturity -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
collateral -2.166*** -2.060*** -2.060*** -2.938*** -2.913*** -2.913*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Borrower Characteristics:      
lnsize -0.255*** -0.288*** -0.288*** -0.156*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Bank Characteristics:      
statebank -0.120 -0.139 -0.139 0.273*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
investmentbank -14.356 -15.412 -15.412 0.887*** -0.175 -0.175 
 (6283.530) (6368.524) (6368.524) (0.249) (0.260) (0.260) 
foreignbank 0.315*** 0.311*** 0.311*** -0.221*** -0.287*** -0.287*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
largebank 1.128*** 0.076* 0.076* 0.926*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (0.160) (0.042) (0.042) (0.054) (0.026) (0.026) 
_cons -9.742*** -8.575*** -9.102*** -23.731 -24.108 -24.488 
 (1.027) (1.017) (1.017) (2528.826) (3990.278) (3987.228) 
Year-Month 
Fixed Effect  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financing Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of loan-
months 
182,025 181,276 181,276 2,384,367 2,303,403 2,303,403 
Number of 
Loans 
76,113 75,690 75,690 700,722 678,329 678,329 
Number of 
borrowers 
      
Duration 
Dependence 
1.17 1.18 1.18 1.64 1.66 1.66 
log-likelihood -8,765 -8,648 -8,648 -32,247 -31,570 -31,570 
Number of 
regressors 
128 128 128 125 125 125 
chi-squared 12,221*** 12,249*** 12,249*** 32,496*** 31,808*** 31,808*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution. Dependent variable is 
hazard rate in  all models.  Sample period is between 1:2011 to 12:2012. All models include year-month, city and financing fixed 
effects. Models (1) (2) and(3) are based on small firms sample. Models (4)(5) and (6)  are based on large firm sample.For each 
variable in the specification Table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in 
parentheses). 








Table 12. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of 
Hypothesis 3   




























































































part_loan 2.889*** 2.214*** 2.214*** 2.213*** 2.162*** 1.599*** 1.592*** 1.589*** 
 (0.075) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.071) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
Period-City Characteristics:       
ramadan -0.391***    -0.337***    
 (0.015)    (0.015)    
bigcity  0.030    0.164***   
  (0.030)    (0.032)   
more_ 
mosque 
  -0.063    -0.174***  
  (0.046)    (0.050)  
more_ 
coursier 
   -0.015    -0.072* 
   (0.036)    (0.040) 
Loan Characteristics:        
maturity -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.038*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
collateral -2.080*** -2.153*** -2.153*** -2.153*** -2.633*** -2.568*** -2.568*** -2.568*** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
intrate -0.146*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.129***     
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)     
Borrower Characteristics:       
lnsize -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.370*** -0.367*** -0.367*** -0.367*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Bank Characteristics:        
statebank -0.090*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.235*** -0.330*** 0.120*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) 
investment 
bank 
1.920*** 1.296*** 1.297*** 1.296*** 1.694*** 1.181*** 1.182*** 1.178*** 
(0.261) (0.255) (0.255) (0.254) (0.285) (0.299) (0.299) (0.299) 
foreignbank -0.187*** 0.035* 0.035* 0.036* -0.305*** 0.188*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
largebank 2.366*** 1.653*** 1.652*** 1.651*** 1.841*** 1.123*** 1.112*** 1.111*** 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.061) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
_cons -4.710*** -7.828*** -7.800*** -7.800*** -4.281*** -7.487*** -7.331*** -7.330*** 
 (0.113) (0.246) (0.245) (0.245) (0.114) (0.233) (0.231) (0.231) 
Year-Month 
Fixed Effect  
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Financing 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed 
Effects 
Yes No No No Yes No No No 






Table 12. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of 
Hypothesis 3   






























































































18,133,124 18,133,124 18,133,124 18,133,124 18,290,806 18,290,806 18,290,806 18,290,806 
Number of 
Loans 
4,333,401 4,333,401 4,333,401 4,333,401 4,469,270 4,469,270 4,469,270 4,469,270 
Number of 
borrowers 
333,278 333,278 333,278 333,278 335,088 335,088 335,088 335,088 
Duration 
Dependence 
1.26 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.29 1.22 1.22 1.22 
log-
likelihood 
-400,157 -348,714 -348,712 -348,719 -467,695 -411,014 -411,142 -411,181 
Number of 
regressors 
106 49 49 49 105 48 48 48 
chi-squared 63,606*** 123,174*** 123,105*** 123,062*** 50,854*** 88,930*** 88,866*** 88,724*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution. Dependent variable is 
hazard rate in  all models.  Sample period is between 1:2011 to 12:2012. Models include year-month, city and financing fixed 
effects. Models (1) (2) (3)and(4) include interest rate variable. Models (5)(6)(7) and (8)  do not include interest rate variable.For 
each variable in the specification Table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in 
parentheses). In  estimations of all models, standard errors are clustered by borrower. 
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Table 13. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of Hypothesis 3 –Different Firm Size 













































































part_loan 2.147*** 1.642*** 1.599*** 1.603*** 1.570*** 1.300*** 1.159*** 1.164*** 1.929*** 1.941*** 1.615*** 1.619*** 
 (0.071) (0.151) (0.085) (0.085) (0.075) (0.130) (0.077) (0.077) (0.170) (0.085) (0.050) (0.050) 
Period-City Characteristics:            
ramadan -0.356***    -0.200***    -0.290***    
 (0.016)    (0.017)    (0.075)    
part_loan# 
ramadan 
0.199***    0.138**    0.130    
(0.050)    (0.065)    (0.113)    
bigcity  0.168***    0.044*    0.101**   
  (0.030)    (0.026)    (0.042)   
part_loan#bigcity  -0.048    -0.151    -0.376***   
  (0.135)    (0.120)    (0.074)   
more_mosque   -0.150***    -0.010    -0.347***  
   (0.050)    (0.045)    (0.088)  
   (.)    (.)    (.)  
part_loan# 
more_mosque 
  -0.285    0.160    -1.394***  
   (0.189)    (0.226)    (0.315)  
more_coursier    -0.051    0.016    -0.125** 
    (0.039)    (0.035)    (0.055) 
             
part_loan#more_
coursier 
   -0.293*    -0.006    -1.192*** 
   (0.153)    (0.173)    (0.205) 
Loan Characteristics:            
maturity -0.038*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.034*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.061*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.057*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
collateral -2.633*** -2.568*** -2.568*** -2.568*** -2.329*** -2.134*** -2.135*** -2.135*** -2.785*** -3.069*** -3.062*** -3.058*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.098) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Borrower Characteristics:            
lnsize -0.369*** -0.367*** -0.367*** -0.367*** -0.508*** -0.520*** -0.521*** -0.521*** -0.160** -0.229*** -0.229*** -0.230*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.079) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Bank Characteristics:            
statebank -0.331*** 0.121*** 0.110*** 0.107*** -0.368*** 0.036 0.031 0.029 -0.396*** 0.058 0.060 0.054 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.118) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
investmentbank 1.695*** 1.181*** 1.182*** 1.179*** 0.064 -0.526 -0.527 -0.527 1.655*** 1.350*** 1.354*** 1.351*** 
 (0.285) (0.299) (0.299) (0.298) (0.827) (0.850) (0.850) (0.850) (0.299) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
foreignbank -0.305*** 0.188*** 0.194*** 0.194*** -0.032 0.261*** 0.263*** 0.263*** -0.630*** -0.255*** -0.252*** -0.249*** 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.125) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
largebank 1.842*** 1.123*** 1.112*** 1.110*** 1.768*** 1.201*** 1.197*** 1.196*** 1.580*** 1.153*** 1.155*** 1.152*** 
 (0.061) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.165) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
_cons -4.280*** -7.491*** -7.332*** -7.330*** -3.922*** -6.798*** -6.754*** -6.755*** -5.492*** -24.239 -24.136 -24.125 
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Table 13. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of Hypothesis 3 –Different Firm Size 














































































Fixed Effect  
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Financing Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed 
Effects 





18,290,806 18,290,806 18,290,806 3,869,472 3,869,472 3,869,472 3,869,472 3,901,955 3,901,955 3,901,955 3,901,955 
Number of Loans 4,469,270 4,469,270 4,469,270 4,469,270 1,222,650 1,222,650 1,222,650 1,222,650 1,268,023 1,268,023 1,268,023 1,268,023 
Number of 
borrowers 
335,088 335,088 335,088 335,088 298,036 298,036 298,036 298,036 19,283    
Duration 
Dependence 
1.29 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.15 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.57 1.66 1.66 1.66 
log-likelihood -467,680 -411,013 -411,131 -411,160 -181,347 -161,616 -161,623 -161,624 -52,352 -46,130 -46,102 -46,104 
Number of 
regressors 
111 54 54 54 111 54 54 54 111 54 54 54 
chi-squared 50,963**
* 
88,963*** 89,056*** 88,851*** 49,941*** 78,818*** 78,832*** 78,792*** 46,346*** 36,638*** 36,695*** 36,690*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution. Dependent variable is hazard rate in  all models.  Sample period is between 1:2011 to 12:2012. Models include year-month, 
city and financing fixed effects. Models (1) (2) (3)and(4) are based on whole sample available. Models (5)(6)(7) and (8)  are based on small firm sample. Models (9)(10)(11) and (12)  are based on large firm sample. Models include 
interaction terms for Ramadan, big city, more_mosque and more_coursier variables respectively.  For each variable in the specification Table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below 
in parentheses). In estimations of all models except for models (10) (11) and (12), standard errors are clustered by borrower. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 












































































































part_loan 1.669***  1.217***   2.242*** 1.617*** 1.667*** 1.674*** 
 (0.025)  (0.036)   (0.026) (0.040) (0.025) (0.025) 
borr_participation  0.462***        
  (0.069)        
twotype  0.739***        
  (0.037)        
parsenior    -0.208***      
    (0.015)      
consenior     0.208***     
     (0.015)     
ramadan      -0.375***    
      (0.013)    
part_loan#ramadan      0.208***    
      (0.038)    
bigcity       0.072***   
       (0.010)   
part_loan#bigcity       0.049   
       (0.034)   
more_mosque        -0.085***  
        (0.019)  
part_loan#more_mosque        -0.322***  
        (0.069)  
more_coursier         0.007 
         (0.013) 
part_loan#more_coursier         -0.375*** 
         (0.053) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 












































































































Loan Characteristics:          
maturity 0.002*** 0.003* -0.002 -0.003** -0.003** -0.017*** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
collateral -2.040*** -1.995*** -2.135*** -2.108*** -2.108*** -2.579*** -2.044*** -2.045*** -2.044*** 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Borrower Characteristics:         
lnsize -0.290*** -0.367*** -0.236*** -0.247*** -0.247*** -0.354*** -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.289*** 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
diff  -0.018        
  (0.028)        
multiplebank  0.157***        
  (0.025)        
Bank Characteristics:          
statebank -0.092*** -0.110*** 0.051* 0.013 0.013 -0.808*** -0.109*** -0.114*** -0.117*** 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
investmentbank 1.218*** 0.273 0.983*** -0.134 -0.134 1.678*** 1.171*** 1.171*** 1.170*** 
 (0.178) (0.304) (0.261) (0.278) (0.278) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
foreignbank 0.251*** 0.188*** 0.091*** 0.024 0.024 -0.395*** 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.252*** 
 (0.008) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
largebank 1.184*** 0.346*** 1.025*** 0.029* 0.029* 2.032*** 1.173*** 1.169*** 1.167*** 
 (0.024) (0.042) (0.035) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
_cons -8.603*** -7.781*** -10.637*** -9.550*** -9.758*** -4.813*** -8.594*** -8.526*** -8.527*** 
 (0.196) (0.244) (1.003) (1.003) (1.003) (0.040) (0.196) (0.195) (0.195) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 












































































































Year-Month Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Financing Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Number of loan-months 9,639,645 9,639,645 3,174,304 3,088,461 3,088,461 9,639,645 9,639,645 9,639,645 9,639,645 
Number of Loans 2,803,983 2,803,983 846,613 825,803 825,803 2,803,983 2,803,983 2,803,983 2,803,983 
Number of borrowers  205,426        
Duration Dependence 1.15 1.16 1.18 1.21 1.21 1.28 1.15 1.15 1.15 
log-likelihood -265,872 -264,658 -69,599 -68,799 -68,799 -357,372 -266,813 -266,815 -266,817 
Number of regressors 128 131 127 127 127 111 54 54 54 
chi-squared 460,982*** 110,540*** 118,939*** 115,397*** 115,397*** 277,984*** 459,101*** 459,098*** 459,093*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution while excluding right censored observations. Dependent variable is hazard rate in  all models.  Sample period is 
between 1:2011 to 12:2012. Models include year-month, city and financing fixed effects. Models (1) and (2) test first hypothesis for the whole sample. Models (3)(4) and (5) test the second hypothesis for dual 
borrowers. Models (6)(7)(8)and(9) test third hypothesis for whole sample and models include interaction terms for Ramadan, big city, more_mosque and more_coursier variables respectively.  For each variable in 
the specification Table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). In estimation of model (2), standard errors are clustered by borrower. 
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Table 15. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of Hypotheses –Different Default Specification (180 
days overdue) 




































































































































part_loan 1.413***  1.157*** 1.313*** 0.115 0.755***   1.975*** 1.631*** 1.411*** 1.426*** 
 (0.089)  (0.094) (0.066) (0.170) (0.039)   (0.081) (0.173) (0.094) (0.094) 
borr_ 
participation 
 0.423***           
  (0.080)           
twotype  0.915***           
  (0.047)           
parsenior       -0.328***      
       (0.017)      
consenior        0.328***     
        (0.017)     
ramadan         -0.445***    
         (0.020)    
part_loan# 
ramadan 
       0.085    
       (0.061)    
bigcity          0.207***   
          (0.036)   
part_loan# 
bigcity 
         -0.239   
         (0.159)   
more_ 
mosque 
          -0.188***  




          -0.043  
          (0.198)  
more_ 
coursier 
           -0.061 




           -0.429** 
           (0.168) 
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Table 15. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of Hypotheses –Different Default Specification (180 
days overdue) 




































































































































maturity -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.087*** -0.053*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
collateral -2.581*** -2.543*** -2.027*** -3.127*** -1.806*** -2.742*** -2.749*** -2.749*** -2.630*** -2.562*** -2.562*** -2.562*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.038) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Borrower Characteristics:            
lnsize -0.408*** -0.460*** -0.538*** -0.196*** -0.584*** -0.300*** -0.306*** -0.306*** -0.356*** -0.350*** -0.349*** -0.350*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
diff -0.087*** -0.006 0.103*** -0.402         
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.026) (0.719)         
multiple 
bank 
0.499*** 0.346*** 0.406*** -0.147         
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.028) (0.123)         
Bank Characteristics:            
statebank 0.082*** 0.066** 0.247*** -0.220*** 0.624*** -0.061** -0.074** -0.074** -0.378*** 0.039 0.024 0.021 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.057) (0.045) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
investment 
bank 
1.083*** 0.386 -0.670 1.247*** 0.080 0.892*** 0.110 0.110 1.699*** 1.112*** 1.113*** 1.110*** 
 (0.400) (0.379) (0.848) (0.214) (0.741) (0.246) (0.259) (0.259) (0.336) (0.343) (0.342) (0.342) 
foreignbank 0.279*** 0.247*** 0.495*** -0.452*** 0.796*** -0.048** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.135*** 0.316*** 0.322*** 0.322*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.035) (0.041) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
largebank 0.943*** 0.284*** 0.989*** 1.089*** 0.400** 0.835*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 1.582*** 0.890*** 0.877*** 0.874*** 
 (0.079) (0.049) (0.084) (0.061) (0.163) (0.038) (0.016) (0.016) (0.071) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
_cons -8.019*** -7.429*** -7.616*** -25.117 -3.133*** -24.683 -24.030 -24.358 -4.527*** -8.025*** -7.829*** -7.828*** 
 (0.421) (0.416) (0.416) (4133.220) (0.469) (2701.981) (2806.459) (2810.247) (0.139) (0.415) (0.412) (0.412) 
Year-Month 
Fixed Effect  




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
             











Table 15. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of Hypotheses –Different Default Specification (180 
days overdue) 







































































































































4,469,270 4,469,270 1,223,012 1,268,043 94,266 1,252,197 1,223,177 1,223,177 4,469,270 4,469,270 4,469,270 4,469,270 
Number of 
borrowers 
335,088 335,088 298,047  94,266    335,088 335,088 335,088 335,088 
Duration 
Dependence 
1.52 1.52 1.42 2.06 1.26 1.63 1.64 1.64 1.66 1.53 1.53 1.53 
log-
likelihood 
-244,795 -242,489 -96,133 -23,098 -14,578 -62,458 -61,172 -61,172 -287,954 -247,830 -247,953 -247,945 
Number of 
regressors 
130 131 130 130 128 128 128 128 111 54 54 54 
chi-squared 68,201*** 64,141*** 51,841*** 28,153*** 24,647*** 91,579*** 89,749*** 89,749*** 39,698*** 62,124*** 61,979*** 62,002*** 
 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution while different default specification (180 days overdue). Dependent variable is hazard rate in  all models.  
Sample period is between 1:2011 to 12:2012. Models include year-month, city, bank and financing fixed effects. Models (1) and (2) test first hypothesis for the whole sample. Models (3)(4) and (5) test the first 
hypothesis for small firm loans, large firm loans and loans whose borrowers borrow only one loan during sample period from a single bank respectively. Models (6), (7), (8) test second hypothesis for dual borrowers 
sample. Models (9)(10), (11) and (12) include interaction terms for Ramadan, big city, more_mosque and more_coursier variables for the whole sample respectively.  For each variable in the specification Table 
reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). In estimations of model (1), (2), (3),(5), (10), (11) and (12) standard errors are clustered by borrower.* p<0.1, 













Table 16. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of Hypotheses –Different Loan Specification 
(Omitted Duplicate Values) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Test of 
Hypothesis 
















































































































part_loan 2.324*** 1.262***  0.747***   1.812*** 1.368*** 1.242*** 1.244*** 
 (0.076) (0.073)  (0.048)   (0.073) (0.139) (0.074) (0.074) 
borr_ 
participation 
  0.233***        
  (0.079)        
twotype   0.913***        
   (0.038)        
parsenior     -0.288***      
     (0.020)      
consenior      0.288***     
      (0.020)     
ramadan       -0.071***    
       (0.018)    
part_loan# 
ramadan 
      -0.011    
      (0.060)    
bigcity        0.207***   
        (0.030)   
part_loan#big
city 
       -0.137   
       (0.130)   
more_ 
mosque 
        -0.198***  
        (0.051)  
part_loan# 
more_mosque 
       -0.195  
       (0.193)  
more_ 
coursier 
         -0.066 
         (0.041) 
part_loan# 
more_coursier 
        -0.197 
        (0.165) 










Table 16. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of Hypotheses –Different Loan Specification 
(Omitted Duplicate Values) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Test of 
Hypothesis 
















































































































Loan Characteristics:          
maturity -0.041*** -0.059*** -0.056*** -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
collateral -2.008*** -2.730*** -2.686*** -2.612*** -2.613*** -2.613*** -2.715*** -2.700*** -2.701*** -2.701*** 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
intrate -0.164***          
 (0.004)          
Borrower Characteristics:          
lnsize -0.179*** -0.341*** -0.394*** -0.227*** -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.295*** -0.287*** -0.286*** -0.286*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
diff 0.149*** -0.003 0.078**        
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.030)        
multiplebank 0.259*** 0.433*** 0.275***        
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.027)        
Bank Characteristics:         
statebank 0.628*** 0.432*** 0.420*** 0.395*** 0.394*** 0.394*** 0.049** 0.379*** 0.367*** 0.363*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
investment 
bank 
1.164*** 0.883** 0.258 0.472 -0.194 -0.194 1.473*** 0.853** 0.853** 0.850** 
 (0.307) (0.399) (0.383) (0.337) (0.334) (0.334) (0.348) (0.341) (0.339) (0.339) 
foreignbank -0.367*** -0.312*** -0.334*** -0.323*** -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.556*** -0.270*** -0.263*** -0.262*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
largebank 1.693*** 1.043*** 0.453*** 1.000*** 0.310*** 0.310*** 1.650*** 0.983*** 0.970*** 0.968*** 
 (0.063) (0.060) (0.044) (0.047) (0.019) (0.019) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
_cons -9.352*** -7.795*** -7.217*** -23.477 -22.731 -23.018 -4.398*** -7.765*** -7.570*** -7.571*** 
 (0.354) (0.359) (0.357) (1475.865) (1457.414) (1457.513) (0.128) (0.352) (0.351) (0.351) 












Table 16. Results of Duration models with continuous Weibull distribution as a baseline hazard function – tests of Hypotheses –Different Loan Specification 
(Omitted Duplicate Values) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Test of 
Hypothesis 

















































































































Fixed Effect  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Financing 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Number of 
loan-months 
13,061,024 13,080,642 13,080,642 3,742,478 3,652,543 3,652,543 13,080,642 13,080,642 13,080,642 13,080,642 
Number of 
Loans 
2,633,388 2,637,296 2,637,296 777,425 759,136 759,136 2,637,296 2,637,296 2,637,296 2,637,296 
Number of 
borrowers 
296,787 297,557 297,557    297,557 297,557 297,557 297,557 
Duration 
Dependence 
1.72 1.77 1.76 2.22 2.23 2.23 2 1.78 1.78 1.78 
log-
likelihood 
-145,859 -179,330 -177,427 -44,383 -43,518 -43,518 -201,963 -181,151 -181,241 -181,272 
Number of 
regressors 
130 129 130 127 127 127 111 53 53 53 
chi-squared 94,701*** 71,016*** 66,682*** 53,316*** 52,396*** 52,396*** 48,168*** 67,650*** 67,780*** 67,571*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results of parametric duration models with Weibull distribution while excluding duplicate observations. Dependent variable is hazard rate in  all models.  Sample period is 
between 1:2011 to 12:2012. Models include year-month, city and financing fixed effects. Models (1) , (2) and (3) test first hypothesis for the whole sample. Models (4)(5) and (6) test the second hypothesis for for 
dual borrowers. Models (7), (8), (9) and (10) test third hypothesis for whole sample and  include interaction terms for Ramadan, big city, more_mosque and more_coursier variables respectively.  For each variable in 
the specification Table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in parentheses). In estimations of model except for models (4) (5)(6)standard errors are clustered by 
borrower. 











Table 17. Results of discrete duration models with Complementary log-log models – tests of Hypotheses – 
Model (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Test of Hypothesis Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 
Dependent Variable: 
Loan defaults certain 



























Excluding Interest Rate, 
City 
 Fixed Effectss 












        
part_loan 1.936***  1.239*** 1.951*** 1.881*** 1.930*** 1.936*** 
 (0.075)  (0.033) (0.074) (0.153) (0.074) (0.074) 
borr_participation  0.625***      
  (0.075)      
twotype  1.277***      
  (0.044)      
ramadan    -0.418***    
    (0.016)    
part_loan#ramadan    0.372***    
    (0.053)    
bigcity     0.209***   
     (0.034)   
part_loan#bigcity     0.055   
     (0.146)   
more_mosque      -0.187***  
      (0.057)  
part_loan#more_mosque      -0.431*  
      (0.221)  
more_coursier       -0.050 
       (0.046) 
part_loan#more_coursier       -0.435** 
       (0.174) 
Loan Characteristics:        
maturity -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.030*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
collateral -2.822*** -2.794*** -3.068*** -2.843*** -2.812*** -2.812*** -2.812*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.013) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Borrower Characteristics:       
lnsize -0.616*** -0.691*** -0.421*** -0.623*** -0.617*** -0.617*** -0.617*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
diff -0.129*** -0.013  -0.169*** -0.130*** -0.133*** -0.133*** 
 (0.030) (0.028)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
multiplebank 0.670*** 0.474***  0.680*** 0.684*** 0.686*** 0.687*** 








Table 17. Results of discrete duration models with Complementary log-log models – tests of Hypotheses – 
Model (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Test of Hypothesis Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 
Dependent Variable: 
Loan defaults certain 



























Excluding Interest Rate, 
City 
 Fixed Effectss 












Bank Characteristics:        
statebank 0.238*** 0.214*** 0.159*** 0.182*** 0.203*** 0.191*** 0.187*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
investmentbank 2.001*** 1.030*** 1.076*** 1.987*** 1.953*** 1.950*** 1.944*** 
 (0.249) (0.245) (0.245) (0.249) (0.250) (0.250) (0.249) 
foreignbank -0.006 -0.030 -0.211*** -0.146*** -0.000 0.008 0.009 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.016) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
largebank 1.303*** 0.491*** 1.259*** 1.355*** 1.282*** 1.267*** 1.264*** 
 (0.063) (0.044) (0.033) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Duration Dependence:        
Log(survival time)    3.106***    
    (0.048)    
_cons -7.754*** --7.039*** -9.751*** -11.954*** -7.847*** -7.648*** -7.645*** 
 (0.245) (0.241) (1.002) (0.182) (0.229) (0.227) (0.227) 
Year-Month Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Financing Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Number of loan-months 18,069,810 18,069,810 5,180,669 18,069,810 18,069,810 18,069,810 18,069,810 
log-likelihood -487,520 -491,278 -133,363 -492,262 -490,070 -490,262 -490,313 
Number of borrowers 335,088 335,088  335,088 335,088 335,088 335,088 
Number of regressors 129 129 129 113 55 55 55 
chi-squared 86,801*** 76,297*** 130,841*** 72,684*** 82,421*** 82,685*** 82,423*** 
Table reports the maximum likelihood results discrete duration models of complementary log log regression. Dependent variable is default in a certain month (1/0) in  all models. All models except for model (4) has 
no baseline hazard assumption. Model (4) has log  time baseline hazard assumption   Sample period is between 1:2011 to 12:2012. Models include year-month, city and financing fixed effects. Models (1) , (2) test 
first hypothesis for the whole sample. Models (3)(4) and (5) test the second hypothesis for for dual borrowers. Models (6), (7), (8) and (9) test third hypothesis for whole sample and  include interaction terms for 
Ramadan, big city, more_mosque and more_coursier variables respectively.  For each variable in the specification Table reports the estimated coefficient, statistical significance level and standard error (below in 
parentheses). In estimations of model standard errors are clustered by borrower. 
 

























Table 18.  Descriptive Sample Statistics for the Banking Sector on a Monthly Basis  
 Total Loans Total Non-Performing 
Loans (NPL) 
NPL Ratio Collateral Ratio Weighted Maturity 
 (000 TRY)  (000 TRY)   Month 
2011m1 21,920,442 1,902 0.0001 0.8790 8.5136 
2011m2 35,103,976 3,836 0.0001 1.0769 10.4242 
2011m3 46,438,576 7,609 0.0002 1.0964 12.7948 
2011m4 54,283,240 28,788 0.0005 0.9918 14.1990 
2011m5 65,254,304 62,874 0.0010 1.1034 14.8006 
2011m6 76,321,528 98,679 0.0013 1.1156 15.5006 
2011m7 77,467,176 134,469 0.0017 1.1486 16.8944 
2011m8 86,371,608 175,815 0.0020 1.1744 16.6502 
2011m9 92,132,416 206,076 0.0022 1.1911 17.0956 
2011m10 98,663,304 408,313 0.0041 1.1801 17.2580 
2011m11 103,161,296 492,109 0.0048 1.1675 17.4314 
2011m12 105,281,624 673,300 0.0064 1.1591 18.3434 
2012m1 110,329,840 773,222 0.0070 1.0445 18.1893 













Table 18.  Descriptive Sample Statistics for the Banking Sector on a Monthly Basis  
 Total Loans Total Non-Performing 
Loans (NPL) 
NPL Ratio Collateral Ratio Weighted Maturity 
 (000 TRY)  (000 TRY)   Month 
2012m2 116,407,288 858,324 0.0074 1.1193 17.8767 
2012m3 118,797,424 956,114 0.0080 1.1292 18.1948 
2012m4 128,527,368 1,121,386 0.0087 1.1024 17.9258 
2012m5 131,887,656 1,229,680 0.0093 1.0994 18.4041 
2012m6 136,438,816 1,409,253 0.0103 1.1118 18.7091 
2012m7 144,657,824 1,688,156 0.0117 1.0992 18.0998 
2012m8 141,964,336 1,890,669 0.0133 1.1186 18.8394 
2012m9 144,636,736 2,397,296 0.0166 1.1106 18.9518 
2012m10 150,711,040 2,692,896 0.0179 1.1242 18.6548 
2012m11 153,682,240 2,884,435 0.0188 1.1560 19.1233 
2012m12 156,680,848 3,353,141 0.0214 1.1471 19.9774 




    










Table 19.  Descriptive Sample Statistics for the Banking Sub-Sector on a Monthly Basis  
  Conventional Banking Participation Banking 






















  (000 TRY)  (000 TRY)   Month (000 TRY)  (000 TRY)   Month 
2011m1  19,850,288 1,172 0.0001 0.8952 8.3623 2,070,154 730 0.0004 0.7238 9.9640 
2011m2  31,163,344 3,482 0.0001 1.1161 10.3214 3,940,630 354 0.0001 0.7667 11.2364 
2011m3  41,322,544 7,249 0.0002 1.1331 12.8028 5,116,035 360 0.0001 0.8005 12.7305 
2011m4  48,565,488 24,772 0.0005 1.0121 14.2819 5,717,751 4,016 0.0007 0.8192 13.4949 
2011m5  58,453,496 57,409 0.0010 1.1370 14.9574 6,800,805 5,465 0.0008 0.8153 13.4529 
2011m6  68,544,000 78,451 0.0011 1.1495 15.6902 7,777,530 20,228 0.0026 0.8164 13.8304 
2011m7  68,860,712 95,071 0.0014 1.1911 17.2337 8,606,466 39,398 0.0046 0.8081 14.1792 
2011m8  77,151,152 128,098 0.0017 1.2178 16.8850 9,220,463 47,717 0.0052 0.8114 14.6855 
2011m9  82,638,208 167,910 0.0020 1.2329 17.3259 9,494,211 38,166 0.0040 0.8267 15.0906 
2011m10  88,429,624 353,821 0.0040 1.2219 17.5112 10,233,678 54,492 0.0053 0.8188 15.0702 
2011m11  92,182,280 427,496 0.0046 1.2103 17.7239 10,979,015 64,613 0.0059 0.8083 14.9749 
2011m12  93,919,152 568,649 0.0061 1.2003 18.6393 11,362,471 104,651 0.0092 0.8187 15.8976 
2012m1  98,368,848 634,091 0.0064 1.0716 18.4850 11,960,999 139,131 0.0116 0.8219 15.7573 
2012m2  104,374,760 695,487 0.0067 1.1534 18.0887 12,032,524 162,837 0.0135 0.8240 16.0380 
2012m3  106,630,984 784,006 0.0074 1.1639 18.4212 12,166,446 172,108 0.0141 0.8254 16.2106 
2012m4  115,991,184 919,579 0.0079 1.1319 18.1059 12,536,187 201,807 0.0161 0.8290 16.2589 
2012m5  118,969,144 1,008,553 0.0085 1.1302 18.6652 12,918,509 221,127 0.0171 0.8150 15.9990 
2012m6  123,459,176 1,189,132 0.0096 1.1438 18.9550 12,979,638 220,121 0.0170 0.8073 16.3705 
2012m7  131,544,728 1,449,116 0.0110 1.1266 18.2573 13,113,097 239,040 0.0182 0.8242 16.5203 
2012m8  128,320,720 1,616,199 0.0126 1.1513 19.1274 13,643,606 274,470 0.0201 0.8113 16.1303 
2012m9  130,928,096 2,065,346 0.0158 1.1416 19.2074 13,708,632 331,950 0.0242 0.8144 16.5112 
2012m10  136,544,784 2,342,104 0.0172 1.1569 18.8962 14,166,257 350,792 0.0248 0.8091 16.3277 
2012m11  138,886,240 2,500,568 0.0180 1.1947 19.4299 14,795,992 383,867 0.0259 0.7933 16.2452 
2012m12  141,960,640 2,961,830 0.0209 1.1986 20.2786 14,720,214 391,311 0.0266 0.6512 17.0734 
Total  108,615,466 1,761,633 0.0133 1.1583 18.0984 11,720,576 275,187 0.0200 0.8043 15.6340 
Number of 
Observations 
 16423908     2089786     
Table reports the recent firm loans in the sample period. NPL ratios are calculated as non performing loans (90 days overdue) divided by gross 
loans.  
 
 
